医学哲学 医学倫理
Online ISSN : 2433-1821
Print ISSN : 0289-6427
臓器移植における自己と他者 : 臓器は人格を持つか
大鹿 勝之
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ジャーナル フリー

2000 年 18 巻 p. 24-34

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In the case of organ transplantation of a cadaver, the donor's family members may say "He/She is still alive in recipient's body" in order to make redeeming sense out of their tragic experience. Is this statement derived from mere personal emotion? Or is it acknowledged as truth? In fact, as long as an organ is regarded as a mere spare part, the donor is dead. But, if an organ is regarded as a person, can it rightly be said that the donor is alive? Locke says, "upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body,'tis evident the little finger would be the person, the same person." Though this opinion may be unacceptable, substituting organ for the little finger in this sentence, consciousness goes along with the organ, therefore it would be the person. From the point of view of that consciousness is caused by the brain, it is nonsense. But from the standpoint of the donor's family, it is not absurd to conceive the donor's character in an organ which is implanted into a recipient. Furthermore, if the recipient should be conscious of the donor's memory, character, and so on, it seems that the organ has psychic and social qualities. So is it possible to admit that an organ is a person? If so, this has a grave consequence. If an organ is regarded as a person, it follows that the recipient recognizes the other person in his/her body, and then, it is impossible to distinguish the recepient from the donor by body alone. In order that the recipient may be identical as the same person before transplantation without becoming two or more persons, an organ must not be a person.

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© 2000 日本医学哲学・倫理学会
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