The fact that the conception of care has drawn our attention expands the definition of the moral realm of Kantian moral theory. It means that we must listen attentively to the "excluded other." And we must resolve the dichotomy between "reason, culture, and law belonging to man" and "nature and sensation belonging to woman." Therefore the concept of care should make us think anew about the relationship between care and the other in health care. Because I do not think that a modern moral theory that includes care which adequate to the way of life lived in complex modern societies can be formulated without some universalist specification of impartiality, I find it more fruitful to construct the concept of care not as a rejection of universalism, but rather as a contribution to the development of a non-formalist, contextually senstive, and postconventional understanding of ethical life. I will describe two conceptions of "care and the other" that delineate both moral perspectives and interactional structures in health care. Following Seyla Benhabib, I shall refer to the first as the standpoint of the "generalized" and the second as the "concrete" other.
