Abstract
Since the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted in 1981, the "whole brain" standard has been legally adopted and widely used in U.S. medical institutions. This standard is a criterion in which an individual is deemed to be dead as a result of the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. Neurologists and philosophers, however, continue to discuss the conceptual issue of brain death. Questions concerning its form and meaning ("What is brain death?" and "Does whole brain death really mean the death of a human being?") frequently arise in journal articles, symposiums, and mediations by the President's Council on Bioethics. In this article, arguments concerning the conceptual issue highlighted by neurological studies are outlined, by examining the arguments of James Bernat, a supporter of whole brain death, and those of Alan Shewmon, an opponent of the idea. Neurological studies alone do not explicate what kind of entity a human being essentially is, nor what kind of entity a ventilated, brain-dead patient should be regarded as. Therefore, it seems that neurological arguments do not suitably address the various conceptual problems at stake. The paper highlights the kind of human entity both Bernat and Shewmon's views presuppose and shows how their arguments are constituted by this presumption, revealing the foundation on which each philosophical position is based. With this in place, the paper examines whether their views concerning the conceptual issue of brain death preserve consistency with an analysis of the concept of the human being as an entity.
