Quantitative analyses of the effects of troop contribution toward UN peace operations on coup outbreaks/successes in troop-contributing countries, 1991–2007

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the effects of troop contribution toward UN peace operations on the propensity for coup d’etat in troop-contributing countries.

Four consequences of troop contribution, some of which promote coups and others that restrain them, are presented: increasing military resources, building up the capability for domestic military operations, dispersing military forces, and internalizing the norm of civilian control.

Each consequence works differently in determining either the outbreak or the outcome of coups, depending on the political regime of the country. Three hypotheses on the relationship between troop contribution and coups are generated by the combination of these factors. Quantitative analyses and simulations that cover coup incidents that occurred between 1991 and 2007 confirm that troop contribution toward UN peace operations by non-democratic countries enhances the success rate of coups in those countries, whereas troop contribution by democracies diminishes it.