In recent years, developed countries have been focusing on “welfare governance”, which is based on cooperation between the public and private sectors. It is thought to promote “social inclusion”.
Social inclusion means improving multiple social problems arising due to “social exclusion”.
However, it is not easy to build on the system of welfare governance because of the inherent differences among the participating actors’ authority, resources, and interests.
Nevertheless, in Britain, the Blair government worked to build smooth cooperative relations with the local actors and develop social inclusion in deprived areas. This article analyzes why Blair government was able to build a stable welfare governance system with respect to social inclusion.
This analysis, relying on “interactive governance theory”, reveals three welfare governance processes. First, social inclusion as a political goal is set up by the government and shared by local actors. Second, institutions that reflect the intentions of local actors and establish the accountability of the government are formed. Third, inclusion projects are implemented by local actors.
Through the elucidation of these processes, this article explores how the Blair government built a stable system by steering each of these processes.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the effects of troop contribution toward UN peace operations on the propensity for coup d’etat in troop-contributing countries.
Four consequences of troop contribution, some of which promote coups and others that restrain them, are presented: increasing military resources, building up the capability for domestic military operations, dispersing military forces, and internalizing the norm of civilian control.
Each consequence works differently in determining either the outbreak or the outcome of coups, depending on the political regime of the country. Three hypotheses on the relationship between troop contribution and coups are generated by the combination of these factors. Quantitative analyses and simulations that cover coup incidents that occurred between 1991 and 2007 confirm that troop contribution toward UN peace operations by non-democratic countries enhances the success rate of coups in those countries, whereas troop contribution by democracies diminishes it.