抄録
My purpose in this paper is to account for some possibilities how reasonably people can be motivated to act along with rules of justice which help them get many interests, through two philosophers’arguments -- David Hume’s and David Gauthier’s --.
Over the past many years, a considerable number of utilitarian interpretations have been made on Hume’s philosophy, because it has been supposed that sympathy of Hume’s theory of justice makes us possible to comprehend or regard one's pleasure from general point of view, and that, it motivates us to act for increase in the sum total of pleasures. Though such interpretations was major until 20th century, as extensive researches have recently been done on the possibility how cooperation can be formed by interaction between each persons who are selfish and rational, the reviews into Hume's theory of justice (especially into convention) have been undertook by some philosophers, contrary to the traditional utilitarian interpretations of Hume's theory.
David Gauthier, who is a philosopher of them, insists that Hume's theory which criticizes the theories of contact law of Hobbes and Locke should be interpreted as a kind of contractarianism in respect of making a point of mutual advantages (he calls mutual expected utility) in convention. On the one hand. I agree with Gauthier’s insistence in the point of clearly explaining motivating reason to form convention through translucency that is a supposition from his contractarian position, but. on the other hand. I argue against his insistence in virtue of the difficulty in explaining how people are inclined to observe their rules of justice without regard to justice in our moral sense which Hume emphasized.
In conclusion, through the contrast between Gauthier’s position and Hume’s one. I will demonstrate that the rationality of our motivations to do justice should be sustained by translucency or value of justice, which are supposed in some realistic positions.
https://ror.org/02xm6sp43 