抄録
This article examines the limit of harm principle by paying attention to the opinions of three American moral and legal philosophers - Gerald Dworkin. Jeffery G. Murphy and Michael Moore - who reevaluate Lord Devlin in the so-called Hart-Devlin debate about the legal enforcement of the morality and by referring to the recent analysis of the collapse of the harm principle by Bernard Harcourt. The reason why I am interested in this topic is that the harm principle seems to be nowadays in a very difficult condition as a ground to justify and control the criminal regulation especially in the field of biomedical technology. Dworkin. Murphy and Moore are given a clue to the examination of the harm principle by Joel Feinberg. who has presented a liberal, fine criminal legislation theory in the tradition of J.S. Mill. While maintaining liberalism and the retributive theory of legal punishment, they give us the possibility of taking into consideration the moralistic reasons besides harm as justifying grounds of criminal legislation. To the harm principle, they each show an alternative viewpoint: conservative liberalism, perfectionist liberalism and legal moralist liberalism. From this, it is confirmed that ways open out to overcome the difficulty that the harm principle faces by developing the theory of justifying the criminal legislation which gives any other reasons than harm fair consideration and weight.
https://ror.org/05f8a4p63 
