The Annals of Legal Philosophy
Online ISSN : 2435-1075
Print ISSN : 0387-2890
Structural Discrimination and Law
Feminisms' Subjects and Legal Practices
Tsubasa WAKABAYASHI
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JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

2005 Volume 2004 Pages 146-153,200

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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to put forward the argument that the role of the law and its relevant subjects should be to dismantle the structural discrimination in the society. The theories and practices of three feminisms liberal feminism, radical feminism and postmodern feminism are compared and discussed.
The liberal feminism's argument is that the female is an autonomous “chooser” and the aim of laws against gender discrimination is to basically remove obstacles for women to allow them to choose and decide by themselves. On the other hand, radical feminism believes that the role of women has been constructed and is deeply embedded in the society, especially by men, therefore their desires are also constructed. To change the structural gender discrimination which women are also part of, it is essential that women be made aware of problems through “consciousnessraising, ” and that through this feminist law should embody women's point of view and redistribute resources and privileges.
Postmodern feminism, however, denies the existence of the subject and rejects the use of law to subvert the gender system. The subject is not out there, it is rather the “effect” of the coherent but coercive institution of biological sex, gender, sexual practice and desire.
According to Postmodern feminism, liberal feminist law keeps the cultural norms and radical feminist law excludes women who are not typical sacrificed “women.” Considering the postmodern feminism's insight, the subject could be understood as a process to become a unique person, and that the task of law is to give adequate room to each person where she could imagine the future herself and try to be that figure. In this way, the law would subsequently lead to the erosion of the fixed binary gender system.
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