The Annals of Legal Philosophy
Online ISSN : 2435-1075
Print ISSN : 0387-2890
Discussing the Legal Indeterminacy Problem
Kenichi SATO
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2005 Volume 2004 Pages 154-162,200

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Abstract
What kind of meaning exists in discussing legal indeterminacy today It is often said that there is no meaning since legal indeterminacy is stale common sense. However, the radical thesis that law is wholly indeterminate is not common sense. It is the very radical thesis that we want to discuss. According to this thesis, law does not have the capability to determine the legal rightness of actions in advance. This conclusion is obtained from Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. According to Wittgenstein, any rule cannot pre-determine the rightness of actions. The current legal practice is characterized by legalism which premises the conventional understanding that law is (partially) determinate. But, the radical indeterminacy thesis collapses such an understanding. We have to turn toward post-legalism.
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