法哲学年報
Online ISSN : 2435-1075
Print ISSN : 0387-2890
法の不確定性を論じる意味
佐藤 憲一
著者情報
ジャーナル フリー

2005 年 2004 巻 p. 154-162,200

詳細
抄録
What kind of meaning exists in discussing legal indeterminacy today It is often said that there is no meaning since legal indeterminacy is stale common sense. However, the radical thesis that law is wholly indeterminate is not common sense. It is the very radical thesis that we want to discuss. According to this thesis, law does not have the capability to determine the legal rightness of actions in advance. This conclusion is obtained from Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. According to Wittgenstein, any rule cannot pre-determine the rightness of actions. The current legal practice is characterized by legalism which premises the conventional understanding that law is (partially) determinate. But, the radical indeterminacy thesis collapses such an understanding. We have to turn toward post-legalism.
著者関連情報
© 日本法哲学会
前の記事 次の記事
feedback
Top