Abstract
The two concepts of “right” and “good” have an important role in the theories of justice, including Rawls's liberal theory and the theories of his opponents such as libertarians and perfectionists. Even though they have different standpoints these scholars treat the two concepts similarly; in their arguments they unanimously presuppose the sole idea of “right”. They argue namely that though their concept of “good” they pursue are different from each other, all citizens in a society would accept the same “right” as the basic condition of their coexistence. Based upon this presumption, these scholars search the idea of “right” through theoretical or historical reflection.
Recently, however, scholars such as Chantal Mouffe, James Bohman and Jeremy Waldron have different arguments: they argue that it is impossible for the citizens to come up with the same idea of “right”, as there are a number of “right” competing against each other, just like there are various kinds of “good”. According to these scholars, in order to avoid a totalitarian simplification, the modern democratic society should not deny this pluralistic structure.
This paper examines the latter theory focusing on its implication to the theory of justice. The following two points are stressed among others: first, this theory will help our understanding of the pluralistic character of “right” in a democratic society, and second, this theory will offer us a new perspective for handling the problems such as (a) the neutrality of the state, and (b) the priority between “good” and “right”.
