中国固有企業における経営者インセンティブ問題

コーポレート・ガバナンスに関連させて

抄録

As the third plenary session of the 14_th National Congress of the Communist Party of China being held in 1993, which proposed to determine the establishment of modern enterprise system as the goal of state owned enterprises reform, the corporate governance issues truly become the hotspot commonly discussed by the academic and business circles. Six years later, the fourth plenary session of the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China of 1999 defined clear that the reform of managerial incentive is necessary in order to advance the corporate governance reform.

In relation to state owned enterprises reform, it contains three major theories respectively the theory of property rights. There are the agency theory and the beyond property rights argument. Some economists insist that the substantial point of state owned enterprises reform is property rights reform. In the meanwhile some others insist that the creation of fair and competitive market system is the main issue for state owned enterprises reform.

Firstly, this report is aimed to review the essence of above three theories. Secondly, to analyze the present conditions of managerial incentive system of state owned enterprises in China. Finally to clarify the reform directions of managerial incentive system of state owned enterprises in China, which are as follows: The direction is to make the property rights of state owned enterprises more clarified, to convert the complex principal-agency relation into simple relation for state owned enterprises, and it is also very important to introduce the competitive principle of the market.