ロシアの化学兵器廃棄をめぐる外交と内政

抄録

How the political leaders can commit themselves over the promises to abolish a specific kind of armament? By which means can they force the domestic actors or stakeholders to change their behavior?
The international rules to control arms increasingly require qualified administrative management, and implementation of these rules significantly affect the interests of the domestic organizations or groups such as the military, the arms producers or the local governments and residents. So, compliance can be discussed as a matter of attaining cooperation among these domestic actors.
This article examines the key sources of variation in the level of compliance by tracing the political process of the chemical weapons destruction in Russia. The recent three leaders (Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris El'tsin and Vladimir Putin) worked with different external enthusiasm and domestic political energy on the problem. This paper concludes that the most significant and direct source was the deliberate and effective handling by the leader, though the institutional changes also had limited impact on the situation.
Compliance was poor, when a large majority of political energy went into bargaining with the local governments over the compensation for accepting the construction of destruction facilities, and when external commitment lacked political decisiveness to proceed against domestic resistance. Compliance was achieved, though with delay, when strong political leadership was exercised over budget allocation and over establishment of effective mechanisms of control over the local governments and the destruction troops. The case deserves serious attention, because it illustrates us that the institutional changes must be followed by strong and effective political leadership.