Design and Practice of Gaming Experiment to Contribute to Policy Discussions for Energy Transition

Abstract

In liberalized energy markets, the long-term benefit of whole society, i.e. the energy transition from fossil fuels to renewables, conflicts with the short-term profit of each company because the price competition dampen the investments in new technologies. This study investigates how the subjective realities of energy companies affect the progress in the energy transition under the dilemma between the long-term investments and short-term competitions. For the purpose, the multiplayer game simulating a competitive energy market is designed, and the gameplay and questionnaire by participants are performed. The analytical results show that there are two types of game in which the energy transition does not progress. In the first type of game, the competitive world view is shared and the intense price competitions actually occur. In the second type of game, a free rider monopolizes the market in which the cooperative world view is shared. These results suggest that not only the policies to favor new technologies to prevent free ride but also the policies to prevent the escalation of price competition is required to progress the energy transition.