抄録
In Gorgias 481 b sqq Plato distinguishes 'τεχνη' from 'εμπειρια' or 'κολακεια' in two different ways (1)the former can προζ το βελτιοτον θεραπευειν, while the latter can only του ηδεοζ στοχαξειν ανευ του βελτιστου, (2) the former can λογον εχειν whereas the latter cannot This paper is an attempt to clarify one of the essential features of 'τεχνη' in the philosophy of Plato through consideration of its twofold qualification above mentioned To begin with the first of the two qualifications, Plato establishes in the same dialogue as one of its presuppositions a thesis that 'το βελτιστον' should not be identified with 'το ηδυ', thus setting himself against the hedonists of the time (Gorg 495 c-497 d) (Here the writer inserts criticisms directed to some of contemporary interpretations of the passage) Another presupposition is that 'θεραπευειν' should be distinguished from 'στοχαξειν' To sum up in brief Plato's words, the man who can θεραπευειν should necessarily have some rational ideas about the practice and the object of 'θεραπευειν' whereas the man who can but στοχαξειν has none Thus the first of the above two qualifications is found to imply the second as its necessary condition As for the 'βελτιστον', however, Plato goes on to give here some further account thereof with much wider perspective in view The 'βελτιστον', he says, cannot be identified with mere privation of evil, but it has in itself some positive character of its own This positive nature is made clear connected with universal ταξιξ which means the fundamental order of the whole universe The 'βελτιστον' in question thus might be taken in last analysis for the highest good-the thing which cannot be caught by 'στοχαξειν' with whatever sort of good fortune This admitted, and thereto added the other presupposition found implied in the terms 'θεραπευειν' and 'λογον εχειν', that 'τεχνη' comprehends as its necessary condition some rational knowledge about its practice and its object, then it will be natural to expect there some higher sort of 'τεχνη' such as commands a perfect insight of the highest good If such a 'τεχνη' should be admitted, this may be said just the perfect and ideal 'τεχνη', and this above all will be absolutely beyond 'στοχαξειν' and so 'εμπειρια' On the other hand, however, 'τεχνη' in its ordinary sense (i e τεχναι οσαι του σωξειν ενεκα πεποιηνται) is definitely stated by Plato to be one which does not always know the truth about the good This meais that the 'τεχνη' is but imperfect and its 'λογοζ' is but 'hypothetical', so that t here might even arise a doubt whether 'τεχνη' could rightly be distinguished from 'εμπειρια' Such a consideration as above about the twofold qualification of 'τεχνη' will lead to suspect the existence of a higher 'τεχνη' on the one hand which may coincide with 'νουζ', and of a lower one on the other which might coincide with 'εμπειρια' This suspicion may not seem to be justified by the text But here comes to appearance the essential feature of the Platonic 'τεχνη' namely, 'τεχνη' realizes itself only so far as it aims at the fulfillment of its idealized qualifications and thus has in itself an upward intentionality towards the final good The real significance of Plato's criticism rendered against 'ρητορικη will only be clear in this way, i e when it is taken to be intended by him to advance ρητορικη, just in the field of political affairs, towards something which would be worthy of the name 'τεχνη'
