Abstract
Against the commonly held opinion that the Philebus is one of the dialogues of Plato in which the method of Divison (διαιρεσιζ) is prominent, J. R. Trevaskis argues that what is described in the methodological section of the dialogue is not the method of Division specifically but classification on its more general aspect. This thesis, however, is untenable, since it strips the method of Division of its philosophical consequence. Right from the Phaedrus in which Division first appears clearly with its methodological articulation, the method is alluded to as composing one half of the dialectician's power of thinking and discussion. And it continues to appear as such in the later dialogues such as the Sophist and Statesman where the Division is amply illustrated. In the methodological passages 12 B-20 C of the Philebus, Socrates urges Protarcus, who like an exponent of the Hedonist position adheres to the unity of pleasure, to admit that pleasure can be seen as Many, in spite of its generic unity. The paradox of One and Many becomes an impediment to philosophical discussion if it is not treated properly. Socrates maintains that it is necessary to appeal to a method (of classificatory analysis) "of which he has always been an admirer" so as to secure a dialectic against a contentious discussion, -an indication that the proposed method is nothing but that of classificatory division as a part of dialectic. However, the actual classification of pleasure which Socrates proceeds to offer (31 B-53 C) does not form a cohesive classificatory scheme, unlike that in the Sophist and Statesman, which present a sort of kind-ladder in simpler form. And this may hinder us from seeing the use of the method of Division in the discussion of pleasure in the Philebus. But, if we take, as I think we should, the antithesis of "true" and "false" pleasure as axial among the various "kinds" of pleasure discussed in the dialogue, the analysis will be shown to be more consistent than it first appears. The concept of 'false pleasure', latent in the Republic but not yet formulated as such, requires much careful and minute discussion to establish. Naturally, Plato cannot promptly proceed to divide the genus of pleasure into the species, as he could in the case of the Sophist, but he establishes the antithesis of "false" and "true" pleasure only after having discussed other types of pleasure such as "mixed" and "intense" as variations of the "false" pleasure. Viewed like this, Division as applied to the discussion of pleasure in the Philebus may acquire more of the character of an "end" of a search rather than a "means" to be used to attain something else. But it may not be surprising, if we take into account the fact that for Plato there was no method to be reduced to a mechanical procedure separable from the dialectician's thought. ειδη διαιρεισθαι may not be so much a means as an end of thinking.
