抄録
Aristotle's classification of beings (οντα)into four types in Cat. chap. 2 is found to be, on close investigation, neither exact nor thorough in some aspects. This paper attempts to make clear the distinction between these four types through the following assertions :- 1) As to the distinction between the genera and species in the category of substance and the genera and species in the other categories, Aristotle says that while both the name and the definition of the former can be predicated, in the latter sometimes only the name can be predicated. In addition, two types of predication should be distinguished, i.e. the specific pred. and the nominal or accidental pred. -Aristotle's remark is valid only in the latter case. 2) The predications in the category of substance are synonymous predications, while the nominal or accidental predications are homonymous or paronymous predications. 3) Concerning the relation between individuals and universals, it cannot be said simply that either one is prior to the other, but in Cat. at least, Aristotle maintains the priority of the existence of the primary substance, saying that all the others are either predicated to or present in the primary substance. 4) The individual properties owe their individuality to the primary substance in which they are present. The different individual properties should be regarded as different ways of presence in the same species of the property. Yet Aristotle distinguishes them as one separate type of being(ον).
