Plato on the Aitia of Action : An Interpretation of his Development from the Protagoras to the Republic

Abstract

Socrates' argument against the multitude's understanding of akrasia in the Protagoras 351b-9a shows that akrasia is not the state in which people are so much overcome by pleasure that they knowingly refuse to do what is best, but simply the state of ignorance. Now, when one compares this argument with the doctrine of the tripartite soul in the Republic, one is easily led to the interpretation that Plato's view on the relationship between knowledge and passion underwent a radical change between these two dialogues. Against this kind of interpretation I tried in this paper to make clear Plato's consistency in his attitude towards the aitia of action, by elucidating the problem he had in mind in dealing with akrasia in the Protagoras and the way he tackled the problem in the Republic. In the Protagoras Socrates begins his argument concerning akrasia by focusing on the thesis that pleasure in itself is good. It is rejected by both the multitude and Protagoras because it is in conflict with the belief, shared by them all and incorporated in their politike arete, that some pleasures are good, and others bad. However, by the scrutiny of Socrates they are made to admit that things are good or bad solely on the basis of pleasure or pain, and also under the constraint of this hedonic-egoistic position their understanding of akrasia as the state in which people are overcome by pleasure proves to be wrong, because it leads to the absurd result that people in the state of akrasia are getting more bad things for the sake of getting fewer good things. Akrasia consists rather in the failure of measurement, i. e. ignorance. People are urgently in need of knowledge of measurement in order to avoid making wrong choices and thus ruining their lives. Akrasia is not the conflict of knowledge and passion as the multitude suppose, but of opinions, and the measurement of pleasure is usually carried out by the multitude only on the level of opinions, as long as they remain in the domain of their politike arete. Their politike arete is simply the result of controlling themselves by self-indulgence, as is described in the Phaedo 68e -9c, and in order to become true arete, it needs to be bound with, or grounded in, the knowledge of true goodness. This I take to be the gist of the argument of the Protagoras. The object of the Republic is to persuade the multitude that justice can be loved for its own sake(II, 357a-8e), and for this purpose the doctrine of the tripartite soul is introduced. This doctrine enables Plato to rewrite the multitude's remark "being overcome by passion" as "being overcome by the worse part of the self" (IV, 439e-40b) and to grasp politike arete, justice, not as an outward event but as an internal state of the soul. Especially noteworthy in respect of Plato's analysis of akrasia is the introduction of the part of thymoeides. Akrasia is now explained as the state in which thymoeides is not reared enough to stand out against epithymetikon even if the prohibition of logistikon is right and thymoeides is eager to obey it. Also, the necessity of educating logistikon and thymoeides through music and gymnastics is emphasized as the means to overcome akrasia and achieve politike arete. However, politike arete remains still on the level of true opinion at this stage, and it is not free from the danger of lapsing into mere calculation without knowledge. Just as in the Protagoras, Plato's attention is fixed in the Republic on wisdom, i. e. the knowledge that presides over such conduct that helps to produce and preserve the harmony of the parts of the soul(i. e. Platonic justice). This is why the doctrines of the philosopher-king and knowledge/opinion distinction are brought in(V, 474c-80). In order to produce Platonic justice in one's soul and to engrave politike arete in the multitude's soul with a view to establishing social

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