Plato endeavoured throughout his philosophical career to repel a grave distortion among his contemporaries of the fourth century B. C. That distortion was the notion of 'philosopher' as(e. g.)"being dead more than alive" (Phaedo 64B, 65A) or "useless to society" (Gorgias 484C-485A ; Republic 473C-474A, 487OD, 489D). This formed a contrast to the earliest occurrences of the words philosophein and philosophos in Herodotus I. 30 (of Solon), Heraclitus Fr. 35 and Thucydides II. 40. 1(of Athenian citizens)in the fifth century B. C. This paper holds that his effort to restore and reinforce the original, proper substantiality of the Greek concept of 'philosophy' was an achievement that is most significant for the contemporary world of today, where science and technology, which have been very benificial for human beings, are now producing many serious problems such as deterioration of the natural environment on a global scale, etc. The main arguments for this contention may be summed up in the following points. (Platonic philosophy ) (1) Plato found that the distortion of 'philosophy' arose from the fact that the majority of people, impelled by the instinctive desire for self-survival pursue immediate needs of the visible and tangible soma(body-matter)or somatoeides (that which is of bodily form) as the most real or substantial. Plato's effort, therefore, concentrated on questioning this pursuit of immediate needs as a guiding principle both as a way of life and a way of looking at the world. Instead, he favoured the invisible psyche (life, soul) and intelligible Forms(the Phaedo and other middle Dialogues). (2) Plato realized the stubbornness of this instinctive way of looking at things and recognized a weak point in the theory of Forms when described in terms of 'participation' (metechein) idioms, which make an ontological commitment to the priority of the individual object intrinsically related to the notion of corporeal(somatoeides)substance(the first part of the Parmenides). (3) To strengthen his philosophical foundation, Plato began with a careful analysis of sense-perception, and thereby obliterated the notion of corporeal substance at the most basic level of our experience(the first part of the Theaetetus). (4) On this basis and that established in his later Dialogues, Plato substantially reinforced the proper conception of 'philosophy' as a definite world-view, of which the fundamental principles are Psyche and the Forms, the corporeal (body-material) elements being ranked as 'subsidiary causes' of secondary status(the Timaeus and Laws X). (Situation of the contemporary world) (5) Modern natural science developed from Greek Atomism, which was a typical world-view of corporeal (body-material) reductionalism. Plato struggled with its basic world-picture which, excluding other factors such as life proper, soul and mind (which the Greeks called psyche) together with various values related to them, abstracts solely the visible, tangible and measurable aspect of body-matter(soma), and thereby achieves great success in elucidating natural phenomena ; science-technology arising from this world view seeks to actualize the immediate effectiveness of man's self-survival and behaviour, which is the basic motivation of that world-picture (as stated above in (1) ). Sooner or later, straightforward advancement must inevitably conflict with those other values which were originally excluded from that world-picture of science. (7)Such conflicts indicate that we are in a situation in which the dictum of Socrates and Plato, that "It is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important"(Crito 48B), has an especially important significance. (8)And that world-picture of science, which has turned out in recent science itself to be appropriate only to the limited realm of

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An Eleatic stranger presents the definition that being is nothing but power or function(dynamis)in the Sophist(247d-e). However, this definition is not accepted by the friends of the Forms because they are afraid of the paradox that Reality must be acted upon in so far as it is known(248a4-248e5). They believe that cannot happen to the changeless. I shall attempt to clarify the purpose of this paradox and whether the definition of being as power is maintained. D. Keyt analysed the paradox and found that it is based on five premises (Plato's Paradox that the Immutable is Unknowable, PQ, 19, 1969, 1-14). (1) Real being is completely changeless. (2) Being is known. (3)To know is to act on something. (4)If knowing is acting on something, then that which is known is acted upon. (5)To be acted upon is to be changed. Premises(2)-(5)entail the denial of(1) , which contradicts the belief of the friends of the Forms. Does Plato avoid the contradiction? If so, how? As Keyt points out, no one has claimed that Plato rejects either(2) or(4). I shall consider premises(1) , (3) and(5). Many commentators(e. g. J. Moravcsik, G. E. L. Owen, I. M. Crombie, R. S. Bluck, W. G. Runciman)think that Plato rejects(1). However, they are claiming that the Forms are subject to change only in the sense that dated propositions are true of them, not that the Forms undergo a change of their own nature when they are known. If the Form of Justice is known by an individual, a temporal proposition is added to the Form, and then the Form is changed in an accidental way. However, this view has no textual evidence. On the contrary, it contradicts the statement in the Timaeus that the Forms are timeless (37e1-38a8). W. D. Ross suggests that(3) is the only explicit hypothesis of the five and holds the view that in knowledge the object acts on the mind not vice versa. Ross ignores the fact that the paradox is meant to damage the claim that the power of acting or being acted upon belongs to becoming but not to being (Keyt, p. 4). Other commentators(F. M. Corn ford, H. Cherniss, G. Vlastos)suppose that Plato himself will abandon(5). They think that the spiritual motion distinguished from the physical does not alter its objects. Keyt and A. C. Ray criticize this interpretation on the ground that the distinction between physical and spiritual motion is not drawn in the Sophist. If it had been drawn, the friends of the Forms would not have adhered to(5). I support the denial of(5). The problem is why the friends of Forms stick to(5). I connect the definition of being as power with the perception theory in the Theaetetus(155e-157d). "More refined and subtle people" in the Theaetetus maintain the principle that everything arises from the motion of two kinds of power, the one being active and the other passive. I suggest the definition of being in the Sophist derives from this Heraclitean principle of being. Plato deliberately omits the crucial word "kinesis" in the Heraclitean principle from the definition of being in the Sophist. It is by virtue of this omission that the definition of being can be applied to real being as well as material things. Moreover, when the notion of the active and passive power is distinguished from that of changes or motions, the definition will ensure Plato's view of the communion of Forms. The paradox shows the absurdity which arises when we connect the active and passive power of Forms with motion or change. Plato's aim in the paradox is to establish the view that the power of Forms need not cause changes in its objects. I conclude that the definition of being as power is maintained and not given up after the paradox and is the key to understanding the meaning of real being.

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Socrates' argument against the multitude's understanding of akrasia in the Protagoras 351b-9a shows that akrasia is not the state in which people are so much overcome by pleasure that they knowingly refuse to do what is best, but simply the state of ignorance. Now, when one compares this argument with the doctrine of the tripartite soul in the Republic, one is easily led to the interpretation that Plato's view on the relationship between knowledge and passion underwent a radical change between these two dialogues. Against this kind of interpretation I tried in this paper to make clear Plato's consistency in his attitude towards the aitia of action, by elucidating the problem he had in mind in dealing with akrasia in the Protagoras and the way he tackled the problem in the Republic. In the Protagoras Socrates begins his argument concerning akrasia by focusing on the thesis that pleasure in itself is good. It is rejected by both the multitude and Protagoras because it is in conflict with the belief, shared by them all and incorporated in their politike arete, that some pleasures are good, and others bad. However, by the scrutiny of Socrates they are made to admit that things are good or bad solely on the basis of pleasure or pain, and also under the constraint of this hedonic-egoistic position their understanding of akrasia as the state in which people are overcome by pleasure proves to be wrong, because it leads to the absurd result that people in the state of akrasia are getting more bad things for the sake of getting fewer good things. Akrasia consists rather in the failure of measurement, i. e. ignorance. People are urgently in need of knowledge of measurement in order to avoid making wrong choices and thus ruining their lives. Akrasia is not the conflict of knowledge and passion as the multitude suppose, but of opinions, and the measurement of pleasure is usually carried out by the multitude only on the level of opinions, as long as they remain in the domain of their politike arete. Their politike arete is simply the result of controlling themselves by self-indulgence, as is described in the Phaedo 68e -9c, and in order to become true arete, it needs to be bound with, or grounded in, the knowledge of true goodness. This I take to be the gist of the argument of the Protagoras. The object of the Republic is to persuade the multitude that justice can be loved for its own sake(II, 357a-8e), and for this purpose the doctrine of the tripartite soul is introduced. This doctrine enables Plato to rewrite the multitude's remark "being overcome by passion" as "being overcome by the worse part of the self" (IV, 439e-40b) and to grasp politike arete, justice, not as an outward event but as an internal state of the soul. Especially noteworthy in respect of Plato's analysis of akrasia is the introduction of the part of thymoeides. Akrasia is now explained as the state in which thymoeides is not reared enough to stand out against epithymetikon even if the prohibition of logistikon is right and thymoeides is eager to obey it. Also, the necessity of educating logistikon and thymoeides through music and gymnastics is emphasized as the means to overcome akrasia and achieve politike arete. However, politike arete remains still on the level of true opinion at this stage, and it is not free from the danger of lapsing into mere calculation without knowledge. Just as in the Protagoras, Plato's attention is fixed in the Republic on wisdom, i. e. the knowledge that presides over such conduct that helps to produce and preserve the harmony of the parts of the soul(i. e. Platonic justice). This is why the doctrines of the philosopher-king and knowledge/opinion distinction are brought in(V, 474c-80). In order to produce Platonic justice in one's soul and to engrave politike arete in the multitude's soul with a view to establishing social

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I offer an interpretation, mainly on the basis of Physics II 9, of Aristotle's claim in his biological writings that explanation by necessity involving only material and efficient causes is consistent with an explanation of the same phenomena by purpose. My argument is directed towards the further question of whether Aristotle also believes that while the essences of certain biological phenomena are partly determined by their role in a teleological system, there is a complete account in terms of material and efficient causation of the conditions under which they exist. Physics II 9 presupposes his argument for the final cause as the nature in the primary sense in II 8, and is similar in theme to Parts of Animals 1 1 where Aristotle criticises the physiologoi on the ground that when they claimed that biological phenomena come into being by necessity, they fail to distinguish what kind of necessity is involved. At the beginning of II 9, Aristotle considers two alternative ways of understanding the necessity involved in generation ; either hypothetical necessity(HN) or HN plus simple necessity(SN). HN depends on a goal. If the goal is to be, it is necessary that certain other things come to be. SN, by contrast, depends on the nature of simple bodies and their movements. Aristotle locates the SN which the physiologoi take as the main cause of generation as a "necessary nature" (200a8) and regards this as explanatory of the goal, only insofar as the latter is purely materially specified as the matter of the goal(ω&b.sigmav; δι υλην). The goal taken as its matter is simply necessitated by its material components in the sense that the material components yield a specified condition for the existence of the goal. Thus Aristotle expresses two modes of necessity involved in generation as follows ; "The necessity, then, is on a hypothesis, but isn't necessary as the same way the goal(ω&b.sigmav; τελο&b.sigmav;) is necessary. For in the latter case the necessity lies in the matter, but in the former case the purpose lies in the λογο&b.sigmav; (account as design)." (200a13ff) Aristotle confirms the two modes of necessity in comparison with a mathematical reasoning. He compares both (1) "things which come to be based on nature(κατα <φυσιν)"(200a16) and (2) "things which come to be for something" (al9) with the necessity involved in a specific mathematical proof : given that the straight is thus and so, necessarily the triangle has angles whose sum is two right angles. While (1) is wider than (2) in terms of their extensions, they differ from each other in that the necessity involved in (1) is determined by the nature of underlying(υποκειμενομ), but the necessity involved in (2) is determined by goal. Aristotle defines nature in "κατα φυσιν" in (1) as a certain underlying based on simple bodies which have "natural tendency for change" (ορμη 192b18 cf. 95 al, 276a26) for both "substances" which "have a nature"(192b33) as formal or final cause and "their per se components" (cf. 73a34ff)which "do not have a nature" (193 a1) specified above as moving upwards belongs to fire. In that mathematical reasoning, the premises or components of the conclusion determine the necessity of the conclusion. This is said to be "in a parallel fashion" (200a16) with the case in (1). On the other hand, it is said to be "in a reversed fashion"(a19) with case in (2) in the sense that the goal which is achieved at the end of generation determines the necessity of the antecedent which comes no doubt earlier than the end. In this way, these two modes of necessity in generation are indirectly compared with each other via an example of mathematics. I conclude that while the purpose as design at the level of Adyoc determines what kind of matter should be employed in

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In order to understand 'the first substance'(πρωτη ουσια)in Corpus Aristotelicum, many scholars have mainly discussed the passage of 'individual' in Cat. ch. 5, and 'form' in Met. Z. But it is necessary to stress the importance of the examples of 'the unmovable principle' in Met. A as the object of 'the first philosophy'. It is clear, from the contexts of 'the first substance' in Met. Γ. 1005a33-b2, K. 1064b9-14 and the related contexts in Met. E, Γ, K, that 'the knowledge concerning a whole region of substances' is 'the first philosophy', and that it is 'the first substance' that is the central object of this knowledge. And 'the first substance' in this sense is neither 'individual' nor 'form', but 'separable and unmovable substance'. Here are the related examples of 'the first substance' in this sense. I a.(Met. A. 6, 7): Substance which is 'simple and concerning the state of realization' (1072a30-32). This substance means 'the first unmovable mover'. And 'the state of realization'(ενεργεια)in this passage is opposed to 'the state of movement' (κινησι&b.sigmav;) , which is especially represented by 'the perpetual circular motion'. b.(Met. A. 8): 'The first and unmovable substance'(1073a30)and the mover which moves the outermost planetary heaven(1073b1-3). They describe not only 'the first unmovable mover', but in detail, also plural 'unmovable substances and principles' (1074a15). II.(De Caelo I. 3): 'The first body'(270b21)or 'αιθηρ'. It is natural to suppose that Aristotle is not clearly aware of 'the unmovable principle' from this standpoint, for 'the first body' shows the circular motion by itself and no outer principle is required. It is quite natural to date these three standpoints in the order of II ⇒ Ia ⇒ Ib. And the central thought about 'the unmovable principle' is especially represented by the standpoint la, and it is clear that the fundamental view of the standpoint la in Met. A is also found in other chapters of Metaphysics and in other books. With these points in mind, we can also point out the mutual relation among the first substances. For example, 'the first substance' as 'form' in Met. Z (1037a5, 28) is neither 'man' nor 'animal'(i. e. 'the second substance' in The Categories) , but 'soul'(φυχη). And in connection with this point, we must take notice of the fact that 'the separable and unmovable substance' is called 'intellect'(νου&b.sigmav;)in Met. A(1072b20, 23, 1074b15, 21, 1075a4). As a result of what has been said, Met. A does not show an isolated thought of the early period, but in some sense, it indicates the essence of the whole of Metaphysics. It seems reasonable enough to suppose that 'the first substance' is described flexibly according to each subject. And we can also clearly point out that 'the first substance' as the object of 'the first philosophy', is closely connected with 'the unmovable principle' which means 'intellect' and 'the state of realization'.

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In 344/3 B. C, Philip II sent Python of Byzantium to Athens with a proposal for the amendment(επανοθωσι&b.sigmav;)of the Peace of Philocrates, which had been concluded between Philip and Athens in 346. Recent Philippic studies tend to overemphasize Philip's friendlly attitude toward Athens and to exaggerate Athens' central role in his plan for conquering Greece. This tendency is apparent in their interpretation of the επανορθωσι&b.sigmav; negotiations of 344/3. In that year, the Persian King Artaxerxes III also sent embassies to Athens and other major Greek cities requesting that they join the Persians in the imminent campaign against the Egyptians. Most studies which emphasize Philip's friendly attitude toward Athens, interpret these events as follows : in 344/3, the simultaneous arrival of the Macedonian and Persian embassies confronted Athens with a clear-cut choice between alignment with one or the other of these two major powers ; Athens, where public opinion had been predominantly pro-Macedonian due to Philip's friendly attitude, clearly rejected the Persian appeal and entered into negotiations with Philip on the amendment of the peace. In this paper, I reexamine this common view, focusing on three main sources : Didymus 8.7-32, Hypoth. Dem.6, and[Dem]. 7.18-32. 1 conclude that there is no justification for arguing that Athens was confronted with a clear-cut choice between Macedonia and Persia in 344/3, that the Athenian answer to Persia shows the friendly relations between Philip and Athens, that in this period Philip behaved in a friendly way toward Athens, or that pro-Macedonian sentiment was predominant in Athens. Therefore, it is necessary to amend the common view which tends to emphasize Philip's friendly attitude in the επανορθωσι&b.sigmav; negotiations of 344/3. Philip's proposal in 344/3 was not an attempt to show his own friendly feelings toward Athens ; rather it may have been merely one of the many tactics he employed to smoothly carry out his program to conquer Greece, which was under way simultaneously in many parts of Greece, such as Thessaly, Thrace, and the Peloponnese. I believe that this conclusion of this paper provides a basis for amendment of the previous historical interpretations of this period, which are intrinsically Atheno-centric.

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The nature of assemblies convened at the synodoi and the synkletoi in the second century B. C. is one of the most inextricable questions in the study of political organizations in the Achaian Confederacy. This is because Polybios' descriptions on the Achaian Confederacy are replete with contradictions. This paper investigated the question above by re-examining the evidence concerning Achaian assemblies. It is generally accepted that the synodos and the synkletos are not terms indicating the bodies of the assemblies. "Synodos" merely means a regular meeting, held four times a year, while "synkletos" means a specially summoned extraordinary meeting. Many scholars have thought that a primary assembly had been originally convened and resolved all subjects in the synodoi, but after regulations were introduced in the late third century B. C. which forbade summoning the primary assembly except for special subjects, e. g. alliance, war or written communications from the Roman Senate, the synkletos was created to deal with important subjects and the synodos began to deal only with routine subjects. This assumption is mainly based on Polybios' description of the synkletos held in Sikyon in 169 B. C. His writings indicate that this synkletos was assembled to discuss military aid to Egypt after an appeal that it was illegal to discuss this subject in the synodos was made. The synkletos was opened not only to the boule but also to all citizens over thirty. Based on this information, the synkletos was generally regarded as a primary assembly which dealt with special subjects. If, however, a primary assembly was convened in the synkletos, two problems arise. First, the membership of this meeting excluded citizens in their twenties and those serving in the Achaian army. This contradicts several passages which imply that the Achaian army occasionaly acted as the equivalent of an assembly. Therefore, it was not an ekklesia that was summoned in the synkletos. Second, military aid was not a subject which required summoning the primary assembly(cf. XXVII. 2. 11-12). Furthermore, several kinds of assemblies could be specially summoned. In concluson, "synkletos" referred not only to a specially summoned primary assembly but also to all kinds of assemblies which were specially summoned (i. e. in the Greek original sense). Therefore, another explanation is required for Polybios' description that the synkletos was specially held in Sikyon. For this purpose, the synodos in the second century B. C. should be examined. Many studies have centered on the synodos and attempted to prove that a specific assembly, either a boule or an ekklesia, was convened in every synodos. Unless, however, one abandons this preconceived idea that earlier scholars have had, the contradictions between the two types of synodoi, a boule and an ekklesia that were mentioned in Polybios' descriptions, are inextricable. By careful examination of the descriptions, it is evident that an ekklesia convened in the synodos dealt with subjects prescribed by the regulations mentioned above to be resolved by an ekklesia, while boulai convened in synodoi dealt with subjects which were not prescribed by the regulations. Besides, Polybios' narrative on the synodoi implies that the magistrates were summoned before a synodos to discuss the subject. In conclusion, one can say that the federal magistrates chose the body of the assembly according to the subject to be dealt with by each synodos as well as by each synkletos. This assumption explains why the synodos held in 168 B. C. could not deal with military aid for Egypt. Since the magistrates summoned an ekklesia in this synodos disregarding that this subject could not be discussed in an ekklesia, a synkletos was specially convened in Sikyon to discuss the matter. One concludes upon these re-examinations that the Achaian assemblies,

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