ソクラテスの倫理的確信とその根拠 : プラトン『ソクラテスの弁明』再考

抄録

In Plato's Apology, Socrates claims that he knows nothing good on the one hand and indicates almost absolute confidence concerning the righteousness of his philosophical activities on the other. I think the latter appears in this claim of knowledge of his. "I know it is evil and disgraceful to do injustice and to disobey my superior, god or man."(29b) What is the relationship between this claim of knowledge and his consciousness of knowing nothing good and how does this claim of knowledge make him confident? G. Vlastos thinks Socrates had a special kind of knowledge and so a certain extent of virtue and therefore thought his life was happy. Vlastos regarded Socrates' knowledge in the weaker sense as elenctically justifiable beliefs and considered Socrates' conviction dependant on such knowledge. According to Vlastos, such knowledge always has 'a security-gap,' i. e. the possibility of being false. However, we do not want to decrease this 'gap' at the expense of our daily utilities and try to live with this fallible knowledge. The trial described in the Apology is not a daily event but a situation unavoidable for Socrates' life and death. For this reason, I can not think that the basis for deciding whether our way of life is just or not is on the same level as a simple decision in daily life. Therefore, even if the knowledge in 29b is fallible knowledge in Vlastos' sense, I think it can not explain Socrates' moral conviction about the righteousness of his philosophical activities. In the Apology, one aspect of the knowledge Socrates ascribes to himself is the so-called 'consciousness of ignorance.' Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness to his knowledge. On his first interpretation of the oracle of Delphi, the god of Delphi allows only Socrates' consciousness of ignorance as a kind of knowledge. The knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b includes moral judgements. Therefore, Socrates' basis for this knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in relation to his claim of consciousness of ignorance. One way to resolve this problem is to take it into account that Socrates apologizes during his trial. In a trial, it is necessary not only to clearly tell his audience what he knows, but also to clarify the basis of his knowledge. But does he need to show the basis of the knowledge-claims in 29b and 37b? What he said there is, if we take his words at their face value, self-evident to his audience, but recognizing what is implied, we(and also his audience)can not accept Socrates' words easily. Namely, he says he chooses the death penalty rather than the banishment from his country. This is what anyone in his audience would expect, but could not be persuaded easily. For without any other condition, anyone of us would wish to avoid the death penalty. But Socrates had an inviolable condition. So in the Apology 29b, he does not simply claim the truth of his beliefs but also emphasizes that there is a firm basis for the knowledge-claim and that he had a resolute will to behave according to his beliefs. I think the very basis which he was ready to bring forward as his witness is at the core of his moral conviction. Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness for the knowledge-claim in 29b and 37b. However, as previously said, the oracle of Delphi does not issue substantive statements or commands. In short, he 'interprets' the oracle as a command of the god and on this interpretation relates his consciousness of his ignorance to the knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b. I think this interpretation makes his conviction firmer. For the basis of his knowledge is what Socrates can not doubt the truth of, i. e. the oracle of Delphi brought to Socrates from an external source. In addition, he accepted this oracle as seriously as his own consciousness after prolonged philosophical activity

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