「適切な名誉心」と市民としての勇気 : アリストテレス倫理学における無名称の徳の意義

抄録

In comparing Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (EN) and Eudemian Ethics (EE), it is significant to note that there are nameless virtues dealt with only in the EN. One of those is virtue concerning small honors; it is the intermediate state of desire for honor as argued in the EN IV 4. Although Aristotle gave it no name, I call this virtue "proper ambition". What, then, is the reason behind Aristotle's decision to deal with this virtue only in the EN? In order to answer the question, I will argue as follows: First of all, I will make a brief sketch of the place of honor in Aristotle's Ethics as a preliminary consideration. Then I will discuss two virtues concerning honors, namely greatness of soul and "proper ambition". It is believed that those two virtues are different in the magnitude of honor that they are concerned with, "proper ambition" being concerned with the small honors that even ordinary people can attain. However, it is still uncertain what the function and meaning of that virtue is from the wider perspective. I claim that argument on civic courage in the EN III 8 can define the function and meaning of that virtue. According to Aristotle, there are several sources of civic courage; those are shame, desire to escape penalties and desire for honor. Opposed to civic courage, a truly courageous man acts bravely for the sake of the noble. In that sense civic courage is not as excellent as true courage, but still we can appreciate civic courage as the better form of courage than the other four forms of "courage". Further, I assert that the relationship between "proper ambition" and civic courage is well confirmed when we take Aristotle's political views into account. In Politics III 4, Aristotle discusses virtue of a good man and virtue of an excellent citizen. From his argument, we can deduce that civic courage is a part of civic virtue required for the city-state, because defending the city-state is one of the roles of the citizen in Aristotle's Politics and that is realized when citizens full of civic courage fight against their enemies. All the citizens are therefore required to possess civic courage. As I have argued, citizens fight courageously when they possess "proper ambition" as proper desire for honor, therefore I conclude that "proper ambition" is the virtue that is sought after in order to defend the city-state. Finally, I observe that Aristotle is paying attention to the political aspect of virtues when he is arguing about various virtues in the EN III-V, while EE, on the other hand, has a less political view both in its list of virtues and in the book as a whole.