Abstract
In the early years of the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union used their nuclear power technology as a diplomatic tool for expanding their political influence on respective friendly nations. On December 8, 1953, the United States initiated a new international nuclear program with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace Address" before the General Assembly of the United Nations. This program regarded Japan as one of the most promising countries that could introduce nuclear power plants since it consumed a huge amount of energy while being short of natural resources. This paper studies the historical process of the atomic energy agreement between Japan and the US in 1955 using declassified documents in both countries. It shows that in spite of various proposals of the introduction of nuclear power plants into Japan including that of Congressman Sydney Yates, the final agreement was only for research reactors because American authorities felt that such proposals might mean an admission of US guilt in atomic bombing. It also argues that the agreement was one of steps toward the hegemony of bureaucrats and politicians in Japanese nuclear policy that made the leadership of scientists, especially those of the Science Council of Japan, decline.
