「民主的開発国家」は可能か

―紛争後の4カ国の経験―

抄録

There are several post-conflict countries, in which the electoral system among plural parties has been introduced after the ceasefire of internal war but authoritarian nature of the ruling party has been expanding (this can be called as the stagnation of “democratic governance” ), in parallel with the steady improvements of administrative capacity and economic management of the government (this can be called as the enhancement of “developmental (or administrative) governance” ). This article examined 4 post-conflict country cases of Cambodia, Rwanda, Angola and Mozambique.

Those 4 cases show the same trends of the stagnation of “democratic governance” and the enhancement of “developmental governance” and steady economic growth. This phenomenon stimulates us to raise the following questions: (1) Is there no relationship between economic development and “democratic governance”? What are the lessons gained from the experiences of those 4 countries? (2) What are the common factors behind those same trends in 4 countries?

The analyses and comparisons of some governance-related indicators of 4 countries have lead to the following tentative conclusions: (1) There is positive relationship between “administrative governance” (CPIA) and development indicator (HDI). (2) There is no clear relationship between “democratic governance” (such as Polity IV, Democracy Index) and economic development (HDI, growth rate). It seems that the introduction of the basic democratic framework such as electoral system among multiparties has been the basis of economic development after the end of conflict, but further democratization might not be essential factor for it.

All 4 countries have shown relatively good economic performance and increasing power of the ruling party under the nominal democratic system. We may call this the spread of a model of “developmental states.” Some argue that the spread of the “Beijing Consensus” in contrast to the “Washington Consensus” is a common factor behind the phenomenon. We can find increasing influence of Chinese aid both in Angola and Cambodia, but that is not the case in Rwanda and Mozambique, where strong aid coordination framework exists initiated by western donors. Although further analyses are still necessary to examine the effectiveness of “developmental states” and the possibility of “democratic developmental states” in those countries, both of “developmental governance” and “democratic governance” should be included as important goals to be pursued in the post-2015 development agenda.