An Inconspicuous Forerunner of Philosophy of Risk Assessment: Cranor’s Analysis for the Proposition 65

Abstract

Philosophers occasionally have published their research findings in journals primarily dedicated to risk research. I select Cranor’s concise paper (1995a) as such an instance. His paper presented a “policy simulation” that compares different processes of risk assessment and then concluded that expedited risk assessment, such as that practiced under California’s Proposition 65, is clearly beneficial in terms of social consequences. I delineate the context of his paper by investigating available published materials. In the 1980s, Cranor learned scientific and legal aspects of carcinogen risk assessments and subsequently participated in the Science Advisory Panel under the Proposition 65. His works in those days were collaborative undertakings involving individuals beyond the realm of philosophy, including scientists and administrative agency staff. Furthermore, his paper (1995a) was outstanding because it makes a substantive normative claim on scientific risk assessment with forthright justification. Therefore, I regard it as a pioneering work of socially relevant philosophy of science, which has gradually gained momentum among philosophers of science over the past few decades. However, Douglas’s paper (2000), published in Philosophy of Science, had the most prominent influence on this trajectory within philosophy of science. In my assessment, Cranor’s paper (1995a) has remained an inconspicuous forerunner up to this day.