Performance Measurement in the French Public Services: New Public Management and Republican Centralism

Abstract

The article analyses the structural and technical aspects of Performance Measurement as part of New Public Management in the French context, at both central and local levels. The centralist influence is analysed through concrete features of the system. Some biases are highlighted in the control structure. The accounting system is described as focused on limited political purposes to the benefit of the Executive, and the recent organisational decentralisation revival in central state public services proves to be due to a strong top political support. An in-depth view of the impediments to performance measuxrement developments then shows that centralism is deeply rooted in cultural republican values, which shape the foundations of both the public service system and the political one, the former being influenced by the latter, through the concentration of managerial and political powers in the hands of a small elite clan. Finally, some emerging reflections are reported, which propose guidelines to reform the whole system.