「場所の論理」はなぜ判断論から導き出される必要があったのか

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抄録

It is widely acknowledged that, with the idea of ‘basho’, Nishida Kitaro had succeeded in establishing his original ‘Nishida philosophy’. Nishida arrived at the idea of ‘basho’ as ‘that which is predicate but never subject’ by inverting the Aristotelian concept of ‘substance’, i.e. ‘that which is subject but never predicate’. Moreover, according to Nishida, this ‘basho’ is the ‘conscious consciousness’ that underlies judgments. Nishida’s originality lies in this turn towards the predicate. However, the attempt to understand the nature of cognition through the relation between the subject and predicate of a judgment was itself not uncommon. At that time, a number of philosophers engaged with what was called ‘epistemological logic’ that emphasized the role of judgment and sought to connect cognition and logic within judgments. Indeed, in “From the Acting to Seeing”in which the essay ‘Basho’ is compiled, Nishida refers to Bernard Bosanquet who is one of such philosophers. By confronting Bosanquet’s ideas, Nishida comes to view the true subject of the judgment in the direction of the predicate and consequently, comes to understand judgments as the determination of such predicate plane. This paper examines the way Nishida formulates his ideas vis-à-vis the problematics of his contemporaries. More specifically, it attempts to clarify the influence of‘epistemological logic’ on Nishida’s idea of the ‘logic of basho’ by considering Bosanquet’s influence on Nishida.