映画的知覚の論理と外部性

西田における叡智性概念

抄録

In this paper, I will discuss Nishida’s ideas of “the noumenal self” (eichiteki Jiko 叡 智 的 自 己 )and “the noumenal world”(eichiteki sekai 叡 智的世界)in his writings dating around 1930s. I will analyze these notions using a few concepts,namely, “exteriority,” “openness,” and “contingency.” The notion of “the noumenal world” underlies Nishida’s entire philosophical enterprise, and is both philosophically unique and problematic. The logical structure of this “noumenal world” resembles what Henri Bergson calls “cinematograph” in Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution. Bergson’s basic logic is that, even though the phenomenal materiality is a continuous flux, our intellects tend to misperceive it as a series of discrete states (“snapshots”), or a succession of static images. Unlike Bergson, however, Nishida considers the nature of time to be precisely cinematographic, and attempts to elucidate the “noumenal” nature of temporality. In this respect, it is possible to regard Nishida’s “noumenal world” as a philosophical analogue of Eisenstein’s montage theory, which defines a montage as a collision of multiple distinct realities. I will investigate how this particular problem of cinematograph complicates Nishida’s philosophical inquires in his middle(and some late) works, namely, his works in the 1930s.