In previous studies concerning the effects of Islamic philosophy on the thought of Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240), the field of ontology tended to be the focus. However, it is seldom considered how Ibn ʿArabī adopted philosophical theories and concepts of psychology, which is also a central topic in the mystical tradition to which he belongs. In the psychology of Islamic philosophy, the soul (nafs) is divided into three kinds, namely, the rational soul (nafs nāṭiqa), the animal soul (nafs ḥayawānīya), and the vegetative soul (nafs nabātīya), based on the Aristotelian conception. Previous researchers have understood Ibn ʿArabī’s discussions using these terms within the framework of the psychology of Islamic natural philosophy. However, this recognition is not based on sufficient research on his magnum opus, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya, or consideration of his intellectual relationship with natural philosophy, comparing it with philosophical texts.
In this paper, I examine Ibn ʿArabī’s discussions on the three kinds of soul in al-Futūḥāt, comparing these with the psychology of natural philosophy as organized in the representative philosophical text written before him, namely, Kitāb al-shifāʾ by Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037). In particular, Ibn ʿArabī’s descriptions of the vegetative soul show the strong effects of natural philosophy. Concerning the rational soul and the animal soul, Ibn ʿArabī —suffering not only the effects of natural philosophy but also the effects of the Sufi psychology, in which theories of the superiority of aspects of the human psyche in terms of nearness to God are advanced—tends to contrast the two souls, giving the former superiority over the latter. Thus, his discussions of the above cannot be fully comprehended only in the framework of natural philosophy. Ibn ʿArabī’s historical role of synthesizing philosophy and mysticism is seen in not only his ontology, but also his psychology.
