Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
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Inner Speech and Introspection
Kengo Miyazono
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2011 Volume 44 Issue 2 Pages 2_83-2_98

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Abstract

    This article explores “Inner Speech Account of Introspection”, according to which inner speech is the source of our introspective self-knowledge. The view hypothesizes that we come to know that we are thinking that p by being aware of the sentence of inner speech “p” accompanying the thought. I argue for Inner Speech Account by showing that it explains six explananda imposed for the philosophical theories of introspection; peculiar access, privileged access, detection condition, the lack of phenomenology, occurent/dispositional distinction, and content/attitude distinction.

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© 2011 The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
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