I. G. Farben's Japan Strategy: The Case of Synthetic Oil
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フリー
1989 年 5 巻 p. 88-116
詳細
- Published: 1989/03/15 Received: - Available on J-STAGE: 2010/06/28 Accepted: - Advance online publication: - Revised: -
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訂正情報
訂正日: 2010/06/28 訂正理由: - 訂正箇所: 引用文献情報 訂正内容: Right : 1.Akira Kudo,“I.G.Farben no Tainichi Senryaku-Chisso no Keesu,”(I.G.Farben's Japan Strategy:the Case of Nitrogen),Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu,vol.39,no.2,1987,pp.50-51.
2.The most important of the I.G.Farben internal records used in this study were the documents on Japan(1Japan1936-45)in the“Pier Papers”(Nachlass Pier),i.e.,“Dr.Pier Projekte:Japan Jugoslavien Norwegen Polen Portgal M 1104 69,”in the BASF Archives.These are the only primary resources on Japan in the archives of the three firms that succeeded I.G.Farben.The documents are in two groups;those for the period between February1936and July1939and those for the period between May 1943and March1945.Matthias Pier was one of the researchers who developed a tar hydrogeneration process in1924.In the period under consideration in this article,he served as director of the Hochdruckversuche(high-pressure experimental laboratory).
3.This article is one of a series on I.G.Farben which attempts to examine business history in the context of international relations.See also“I.G.Farben no Tainichi Senryaku-Senryo no Keesu”(I.G.Farben's Japan Strategy:the Case of Dyes)Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kiyo,vol.36,1987;“I.G.Farben no Kaitai”(The Dissolution of I.G.Farben),Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu,vol.38,nos.1,4,1986,and no.5,1987;and the aforementioned“I.G.Farben no Tainichi Senryaku -Chisso no Keesu.”
4.Akira Kudo,“I.G.Farben no Seiritsu to Tenkai(2),”(The Establishment and Development of I.G. Farben[Part2]),Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu,vol.29,no.6,1978,pp.108-112,138-142and155-163. Very little consideration was given from the beginning to exports.Aside from cost and shipping problems,the firm had difficulty predicting where a profitable export market might be.Part of the reason for this was no doubt the fact that developing a synthetic fuel production capability and sustaining a production capacity therein were crucial elements in achieving economic autarky and military self-sufficiency.Fuel could be stored,but any demand arising from such action would be extremely limited and in any case,importing synthetic fuel could be considered inherently contradictory.
5.In August1928,a report issued by a Fuel Committee made up of representatives from the various ministries called for“helping industries that develop alternative fuels to oil and encouraging research in this area,”and for“undertaking research in coal liquefication.”However,the report did not go beyond simply encouraging such work.In May1930,a Ministry of Commerce and Industry commission of inquiry called for measures to encourage research into coal liquefication as part of a national fuel policy,but it went no further.In September1933,a Liquid Fuel Committee composed of ministry representatives drew up a set of guidelines for a national fuel policy.One of the four main proposals was for the promotion of alternative fuel development.The committee directly called for industrial development in this area and cited the need to complete research on coal liquefication and then develop concrete plans for large-scale production.In a rider to the Oil Industry Law of March1934,the Lower House of the Diet attached a resolution calling for the government to develop as quickly as possible a basic policy for the acquisition and development of oil resources and the production of alternative fuels.See Haruhito Takeda,“Nenryokyoku Sekiyu Gyosei Zenshi”(An Administrative History of the Early Years of the Fuel Bureau),in Sangyo Seisakushi Kenkyujo,ed.,Sangyo Seisaku Kenkyu Shiryo(Research Material on Industrial Policy), Sangyo Seisakushi Kenkyujo,1979,pp.205-208,213,221-222and226.See also Munehiro Miwa,“Jinzo Sekiyu Seizo Keikaku to sono Zasetsu-Senzen Nihon no Ekitai Nenryo Mondai”(Synthetic Oil Production Planning and the Failure Thereof:Prewar Japan's Liquid Fuel Problem),unpublished master's thesis,Tokyo Kogyo Daigaku,Faculty of Engineering,1985,Chapters2and3.
6.Takeda,op.cit.,p.236.
7.Jinzo Sekiyu Jigyoshi Hensan Kankokai;ed.,Hompo Jinzo Sekiyu Jigyoshi Gaiyo(A Summary History of Japan's Synthetic Oil Industry),Jinzo Sekiyu Jigyoshi Hensan Kankokai,1956,pp.3-5.See also Nihon Taaru Kogyokai,ed.,Nihon Taaru Kogyoshi(A History of Japan's Tar Industry), Nihon Taaru Kogyokai,1965,pp.305-307;and Tsushosangyosho,ed.,Shoko Seisakushi(A History of Commercial and Industrial Policy),vol.20,Kagaku Kogyo(The Chemical Industry),pt.1(by Chuichi Nakamura),Shoko Seisakushi Kankokai,1968,pp.277-278.
8.Ryuichiro Enomoto,Kaiso80Nen(An80-Year Retrospective),Hara Shobo,1976,pp.191,194.
9.Preliminary calculations by government officials(c.1937)estimated that gasoline produced by direct liquefication would sell for74-75sen per gallon.For synthetic fuel,the figure was67-68sen. Compared to gasoline produced from natural oil,these figures were higher by22to30sen.Thereafter, however,profitability was not an issue.See Akira Okabe,Sekiyu(Petroleum),Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 1986,p.85.
10.Jinzo Sekiyu Jigyoshi Hensan Kankokai,op.cit.,p.7.
11.Enomoto,op.cit.,p.177.
12.Aus Besprechungen mit Tillmann and Vigeveno,18.Juli1938.
13.Hoshimi Uchida,“Taisho Showa Shoki no Kagaku Kogyo ni okeru Gijutsu Donyu to Jishu Kaihatsu-Kokusai Gijutsu Iten Katei to shite mita Kigyo Katsudo”(Technological Transfer and the Autonomous Development of Technology in the Chemical Industry During the Taisho and Early Showa Periods:Industrial Activity in the Process of the Transfer of Technology),Keiei Shigaku,vol.7,no. 1,1972,pp.69-70.See also Kudo,“I.G.Farben no Tainichi Senryaku-Chisso no Keesu.”
14.Except where noted,the following account is based on Hermann Bosch an Carl Krauch,21.Februar 1936.
15.The South Manchurian Railway first wanted to make arrangements to introduce the I.G.process in 1928,in cooperation with the Navy.It was in that year that the Navy was given the task of researching coal liquefication.See Hideo Waki,“Sekitan Ekikaho Kenkyu o megutte(Ge)”(Research on Methods of Coal Liquefication[pt.2]),Tokuyama Daigaku Sogo Keizai Kenkyujo Kiyo,vol.4,1982,pp. 139-141;and Miwa,op.cit.,Chapter4,Section1.
16.Rights to the Bergius process were originally controlled by the International Hydrogeneration Patent Company(IHP)and later by IHEC as well.IHP and IHEC were set up in The Hague by I.G.Farben, ICI,Standard Oil of New Jersey and Royal Dutch Shell,each of which gave the rights to their hydrogeneration processes to these international organizations.See Mitsubishi Shoji Kabushikikaisha,Ritsugyo Boeki Roku(Company Trade Records),Mitsubishi Shoji Kabushikikaisha,1958, p.213.At that time,there was a limited understanding in Japan of the“immense world presence”of these organizations.See Yoshinosuke Abe,Sekitan Ekika(Coal Liquefication),Daiyamondosha,1938,pp. 183-184.By1927,I.G.Farben had already reached an agreement with Standard Oil of New Jersey for exclusive rights to hydrogeneration technology.Royal Dutch Shell and ICI later became partners in this agreement.See Kudo,“I.G.Farben no Seiritsu to Tenkai(2),”p.166and the document cited therein,W.J.Reader,Imperial Chemical Industries:History,vol.2,London,1975,pp.169-170.
17.Man-yukai,ed.,Manshu Kaihatsu40Nenshi(A Forty-Year History of the Development of Manchuria), vol.2,Man-yukai,1964,p.619.For details on the South Manchurian Railway project,see Kagaku Gijutsucho Shigen Chosasho,ed.,Waga Kuni ni okeru Sekitan Chokusetsu Ekika ni kansuru Kogyo Gijutsu-Senji chu no Kaihatsu Gijutsu o chushin ni(Coal Liquefication Technology in Japan: Technical Developments in World War II),Kagaku Gijutsucho Shigen Chosasho,1978,Chapter3;and Miwa, op.cit.,Chapter4,Section2.Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company,which had perfected synthetic ammonia production using the Casale method and was increasingly proficient at high-pressure production techniques,built a factory at Agochi in1936capable of annually producing50,000kilolitres.See Kagaku Gijutsucho Shigen Chosasho,op.cit.,Chapter2;Eiji Manakata,“Agochi(Sekitan Ekika)Kojo no Omoide”(Memories of the Agochi Coal Liquefication Factory),in Shoji Kamata,ed.Nihon Chisso Shi e no Shogen(Material on the History of the Japanese Nitrogen Industry),vol.4,1978;and Yango Shibamura,Kigyo no Hito Noguchi Shitagau Den(A Biography of Shitagau Noguchi,Industrial Pioneer), Yuhikaku,1981,pp.254,258-262.
18.Krauch an Bosch,31.Marz1936.
19.Besprechung ber Japanprojekt am4.Marz1937,TD Memo1041,17-3-1937;Besuch Ludwigshafen12-15April 1937,TD Memo1063,16-4-1937;Kostenschatzung fur die Hydrierung von Fushun Schieferol,TD-B-3482,9. Juli1937,etc.
20.Mitsubishi Kogyo Semento Kabushikikaisha,ed.,Mitsubishi Kogyo Shashi(A History of the Mitsubishi Mining Company),Mitsubishi Kogyo Semento Kabushikikaisha,1976,pp.336-369.This work does not mention introducing the I.G.process.For information on hydrogeneration research at the Mitsubishi Kogyo Kenkyujo,see Arimasa Shibuya,“Senzen no Jinzo Sekiyu Kaihatsu Mitsubishi Kogyo Kenkyujo-Rikugun Nenryosho”(Prewar Synthetic Oil Development at the Mitsubishi Mining Research Institute and the Army Fuel Depot),in Rikunenshi Hensan Iinkai,ed.,Rikugun Nenryoshoshi Gijutsu-hen Manshuhen(A History of the Army Fuel Depot:The Technology Section and the Manchuria Section),Rikugunkai,1979,pp.31-35.
21.Angebot auf eine Benzin-Anlage fur die Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha G.m.b.H.,Berlin,Oktober1937.
22.Mitsubishi Shoji Kabushikikaisha,op.cit.,p.214.
23.See Kudo,“I.G.Farben no Tainichi Senryaku-Chisso no Keesu,”pp.68-69.
24.Shibamura,op.cit.,p.254,261.
25.Except where noted,this section and the following section are based on Zusammenfassung uber die japanischen HydrierProjekte,3.Mai1939.
26.Nakahara noted in his diary that Ogura asked for bids on reaction chambers,boilers and compressors from Ishikawajima,Oriental Babcock and Krupp.See Hideo Okuda,Nakahara Nobuhei Den(A Biography of Nobuhei Nakahara),Toa Nenryo Kogyo Kabushikikaisha,1981.pp.145-146.
27.Ruhl was originally sent to Japan to oversee the construction of methanol facilities.At this point,he was mainly responsible for handling technical matters involving nitrogen and synthetic fuel.
28.Ogura Oil hoped to move into production of high-octane gasoline and lubricating oil for airplanes and to this end set up a research institute in May1937.See Okuda,op.cit.,pp.140-145.
29.Zur Besprechung mit der IHEC uber Japan am4.7.1939,1.Juli1939.
30.Okuda,op.cit.,p.148.
31.Ibid.,p.147.
32.Ibid.,p.148.
33.Toa Nenryo Kogyo Kabushikikaisha,ed.,Tonen30Nen Shi(A Thirty-Year History of the Toa Fuel Company),vol.1,Toa Nenryo Kogyo Kabushikikaisha,1971,pp.79-94.Okuda,op.cit.,pp.174-179.
34.Besprechung in Leuna uber Auslandsprojekte,9.Juni1939.The president of the Imperial Fuel Industry Company was Tamaki Makita,former chairman of the board of Mitsui Mining.The position of head of the synthetic oil division in the Fuel Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was controlled by the Navy-such were the limits under which I.G.Farben viewed the Toa Project.It should be pointed out,however,that Mitsubishi contributed capital to the Imperial Fuel Industry Company and that the Army had its own commissioned officers in the Fuel Bureau.Makita also served as a consultant to Ogura and Nakahara sought his advice on all matters of consequence,including those involving I.G.Farben.There was a tendency on I.G.Farben's part to view Ruhr,the Navy and Mitsui as a hostile block,but this was a misconception.For information on Makita's role in the Imperial Fuel Industry Company,see Hidemasa Morikawa,ed.,Makita Tamaki Denki Shiryo(Biographical Material on Tamaki Makita),Nihon Keieishi Kenkyujo,1982,pp.320-324.For information on the close relationship between Nakahara and Makita, see Hidemasa Morikawa,“Ogura Sekiyu to Nakahara Nobuhei-Keieisha Kigyo no Seiritsu ni kansuru Ichikosatsu”(The Ogura Oil Company and Nobuhei Nakahara:A Case for the Development of Managerial Enterprise),Keiei Shigaku,vol.22,no.2,1987,especially pp.16-25.
35.Zur Besprechung mit der IHEC uber Japan am4.7.1939,1.Juli1939,op.cit.
36.Aktennotiz.Besprechung in Ludwigshafen uber japanische Projekte,am 3.,4.und5.Juli1939,5.Juli1939.
37.In Toa Nenryo Kogyo Kabushikikaisha,op.cit.,vol.2,p.356,Nobuhei Nakahara,who handled negotiations with I.G.Farben for Ogura Oil,is quoted as saying:Ogura ran into opposition from the Navy just when it was about to succeed in bringing in technology[from I.G.Farben].The Navy was virulently opposed to Ogura's actions on the grounds that,since it was doing research on hydrogeneration at its Tokuyama facility,there was no need to buy IHP's technology;and that,if such a purchase were made,patent agreements would require that Japan share its own technology with other nations as well.The Tokuyama Fuel Depot was the real reason for the Navy's intransigence.We were young at the time and argued vociferously for buying the IHP technology that I.G.Farben was selling because it was the world's most advanced and also had substantial military application.The Army,especially the Army Air Corps,thought that we should go ahead regardless of any opposition,and in the end Ogura Oil was unable to buy the rights to the I.G.process.IHP had set a price of\3million which was not unreasonable for Ogura Oil.We therefore lost the chance to get the most advanced technology available at very favorable terms.An application for rights from IHP was submitted in Japan in1935and was approved.See Okuda,op.cit.,p.149.On p.148,Okuda quotes Sueto Kajiki,of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Fuel Bureau,as noting that“Nakahara's activities incurred the wrath of the Navy,which called him a traitor.”See also Kajiki's recollections of the matter in Sangyo Seisakushi Kenkyujo,ed.,Nenryokyoku Sekiyu Gyosei ni kansuru Zadankai(A Symposium on the Fuel Bureau's Oil Policy),Sangyo Seisakushi Kenkyujo,1978,p.90.According to Isaburo Watanabe,who at the time was in the Navy's Munitions Bureau,Ogura Oil President Fusazo Ogura visited Nagaaki Ujiie,head of the Munitions Bureau,and told him of the activities of his employee Nakahara.This account is based on an interview with Watanabe on August17,1987.With regard to the Navy's opposition,Takeo Takahashi of the Natural Resources Division of the Army's Supply Bureau wrote that:As of1939,the Army had plans to buy equipment from I.G.Farben to produce60,000kiloliters of liquefied coal annually,as well as catalytic cracking equipment from America's UOP to produce40,000kiloliters annually.The Navy opposed the idea of buying from I.G.Farben on the grounds that it had almost finished its own research on the necessary technology;and the Treasury opposed it because of a shortage of foreign currency reserves.So nothing was ever done in the matter;this,at least,is what I heard later.See Takeo Takahashi,Yudan no Gen'el(The Illusion of Negligence),Jijitsushinsha,1985,pp.67-68.When interviewed on June30,1986,Takahashi said that“the word in the Army was that it had been outmaneuvered by the Navy;”but this may have been a reference to the Army Fuel Depot project,which had been slated to start in 1938.
38.For information on this project,See Takafusa Nakamura,Senji Nihon no Kahoku Keizai Shihai(Japan's Wartime Control of the North China Economy),Yamakawa Shuppansha,1983,pp.185-186.
39.Zur Besprechung mit der IHEC uber Japan am4.7.1939,1.Juli1939,op.cit.
40.Besprechung in Leuna ber Auslandsprojekte,9.Juni1939,op.cit.
41.See also Zur Besprechung mit der IHEC uber Japan am4.7.1939,1.Juli1939,op.cit.Nissan's own company history has no account of this.
42.In Nihon Sekiyu Kabushikikaisha,ed.,Nihon Sekiyu Shi(A History of Nippon Oil Company),Nihon Sekiyu Kabushikikaisha,1958,pp.400-406and438-442,there is some discussion of supply and demand for synthetic oil,but no mention of Nihon Sekiyu's own project.
43.With regard to the license fee,see Zur Besprechung mit der IHEC uber Japan am4.7.1939,1.Juli1939,op.cit.
44.Tokyo Gas began experiments in low-temperature carbonization in1936and succeeded in annually producing30,000tons of lowtemperature tar.Thereafter,work was started on a hydrogeneration facility for synthetic oil in Yokohama.Construction started on a low-temperature carbonization furnace,which began partial operation in October1940.But,unable to achieve acceptable results,the company abandoned this endeavor two years later.See Tokyo Gasu Kabushikikaisha,ed.,Tokyo Gasu70Nen Shi(A Seventy-Year History of the Tokyo Gas Company),Tokyo Gasu Kabushikikaisha,1956,pp.135-136.
45.In1938,Sumitomo began plans for methanol and isobutanol production.Plans were drawn up in February1939for a methanol plant in Sunagawa,Hokkaido.In May of that year,plans were made for a facility in Anshan,Manchuria to produce synthetic oil,ammonium nitrate and butanol.See Sumitomo Kagaku Kogyo Kabushikikaisha,ed.,Sumitomo Kagaku Kogyo Kabushikikaisha Shi(A History of Sumitomo Chemical Company),Sumitomo Kagaku Kogyo Kabushikikaisha,1981,pp.71-73.
46.See also Zur Besprechung mit der IHEC uber Japan am4.7.1939,1.Juli1939,op.cit.Showa's own company history makes no mention of the matter.
47.For information on this firm's plans and on plant construction,see Hiroshi Ibuki,“Sekitan Ekika ni Dokuji no Michi o hiraita Manshu Yuka Kogyo[Kabu]no Zembo”(The Whole Story of How the Manchuria Coal Liquefication Company Developed its own Liquefication Process),in Rikunenshi Hensan Iinkai,op.cit.,pp.16-21.
48.Aus Besprechungen mit Tillmann and Vigeveno,18.Juli1938,op.cit.;Aktennotiz.Besprechung in Ludwigshafen uber japanische Projekte,am3.,4.und5.Juli1939,5.Juli1939,op.cit.
49.See Takahashi,op.cit.,pp.112-114,for information on the Army's attitude toward this project.
50.Mitsubishi Shoji's records indicate that in1921,Mitsubishi's Ber-lin office acted on behalf of the South Manchurian Railway and the Navy in the matter of the Bergius process.Both parties submitted sample raw material to I.G.Farben for test purposes,and tests were conducted,but nothing else was done for quite a while.The office also entered into discussions with IHEC over patent rights,but IHEC's terms were so stringent that no agreement was reached.See Mitsubishi Shoji Kabushikikaisha,op.cit.,p.213.
51.Aus Besprechungen mit Tillmann und Vigeveno,18.Juli1938,op.cit.
52.Besprechung in Leuna uber Auslandsprojekte,9.Juni1939,op.cit.
53.Zur Besprechung mit der IHEC uber Japan am4.7.1939,1.Juli1939,op.cit.
54.H.Ahrens'Ariga advised Nakahara to consider the Houdry catalytic cracking process.See Okuda,op.cit.,p.210.
55.Ibid.No reports have been found for the two subsequent meetings held on June 14 and 15.
56.According to Jinzo Sekiyu Jigyoshi Hensan Kankokai,op.cit.,p.7,this“general license”[for the Fischer process]was to cover Japan,Manchuria and the five provinces of North China as well as include the rights to all technological advances made through1937at Ruhrchemie.
57.Zusammenfassung uber die japanische Hydrier-Projekte,3.Mai1939,op.cit.
58.Aktennotiz.Besprechung in Ludwigshafen uber japanische Projekte,am3.,4.und5.Juli1939,5.Juli1939,op.cit.
59.Details on this are unavailable.No statistical figures are included in the records.
60.Aus Besprechungen mit Tillmann und Vigeveno,18.Juli1938,op.cit.
61.Bosch an Krauch,21.Februar1936,op.cit.
62.Kudo,“I.G.Farben no Seiritsu to Tenkai(2),”pp.162-163.
63.Jinzo Sekiyu Jigyoshi Hensan Kankokai,op.cit.,p.233.See also Tomijiro Murata's observations in Tokuji Watanabe,ed.,Gendai Nihon Sangyo Hattatsushi(A History of Industrial Development in Modern Japan),vol.13,Kagaku Kogyo(The Chemical Industry),pt.1,Kojunsha Shuppankyoku,1968,p.526.For details on the failure of the1937policy to promote synthetic oil production,see Miwa,op.cit.,Chapter5,Section1and Miwa,“Tai-Ei Bei Ran Kaisen to Jinzo Sekiyu Seizo Keikaku no Zasetsu,”(The Outbreak of War with Britain,the United States and Holland and the Failure of Synthetic Oil Production Plan),Nihon Rekishi,1987,(February),pp.69-74.
64.Enomoto,op.cit.,pp.151-152.
65.Mitsubishi Shoji Kabushikikaisha,op.cit.,p.214and Takahashi,op.cit.,pp.111,112 and 115.
66.Jinzo Sekiyu Jigyoshi Hensan Kankokai,op.cit.,p.16and Takahashi,op.cit.,pp.155-164.
67.Angebot auf eine Anlage fur die Kaiserliche Japanische Armee,Marz1944.
68.Vertrag,11.Januar1945.See also Toshisada Kinoshita,“I.G.Ho Sekitan Ekika Gijutsu no Donyu Mondai”(The Attempt to Introduce the I.G.Coal Liquefication Technology to Japan),in Rikunenshi Hensan Iinkai,op.cit.,pp.12-13;Toshisada Kinoshita,“Taio Kaiso”(Memoirs of Europe),in Berlinkai,ed.,Taisen chu Zaidoku Rikugun Kankeisha no Kaiso (Memoirs of Army Personnel in Germany during the War),Berlinkai,1981,pp.133-134;Yoshiomi Mikami,Doitsu to Watashi(Germany and I),Ibid.,pp.254-255;Mitsubishi Shoji Kabushikikaisha,op.cit.,p.214;and Takahashi,op.cit.,pp.190-194.
69.Pier an Kelchner(Rustungsvollmachtigten Sudwest des Reichsministers fiir Riistung and Kriegsproduktion),24.Marz1945.
70.Pier an Butefisch,25Marz1945.
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