Transactions of the Japan Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Online ISSN : 2424-0982
ISSN-L : 0917-2246
A Study of Dilemma-Solving Effects by the Co-evolution of Both Social Networks and Strategy in a 2×2 Symmetry Game(Practice)
Jun Tanimoto
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2008 Volume 18 Issue 1 Pages 17-27

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Abstract
A 2×2 symmetry game model implemented by a co-evolution mechanism of both networks and strategy, inspired by Zimmermann & Eguiluz's work is established. A Series of numerical experiments, considering various 2×2 game structures, reveals that the proposed co-evolution mechanism can solve dilemmas in several game classes. The effect of solving a dilemma means the mutual-cooperation reciprocity (R reciprocity), which is brought about by emerging several cooperative hub agents who have plenty of links. The co-evolution mechanism, however, seems counterproductive for game classes of Leader and Hero, where the alternating reciprocity (ST reciprocity) is meaningful.
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© 2008 The Japan Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
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