Giving an Opinion in Deliberation

From the Viewpoint of the “Position” of a Lay Judge’s Turn

Abstract

In this paper, we explore some interactional environments in which lay judges give their opinion in deliberation. It has been said that there is an extremely asymmetric relationship between judges and lay judges in that the former possess professional knowledge about law while the latter do not. Some studies conclude that such asymmetries must be removed from interaction in deliberation; otherwise, judges have interactional hegemony and lay judges are less able to freely give their opinion. In contrast, we analyze data from mock trials and propose some different conclusions. From the viewpoint of the “position” of a lay judge’s turn in the turn-taking system, we can distinguish four possibilities for how lay judges take their turn: P1, self-selection after a judge’s turn; P2, other-selection after a judge’s turn; P3, self-selection after a lay judge’s turn; P4, other-selection after a lay judge’s turn. We examine each possibility and suggest that P2 has some advantages in terms of lay judges giving their opinion, whereas it has been criticized as having a “judge hegemony” character of interaction. First, P2 is the possibility in which lay judges are given the legitimate and exclusive right to give their opinion. Second, in P2, lay judges can use their turn for doing something other than answering a judge’s question. Third, judges can treat lay judges as “professionals” by using specific membership categorization devices in their questioning.