While judicial experts such as the Supreme Court, lawyers' association and the Ministry of Justice dominated the designs of the judicial system for many years in Japan, the users of the judicial services recently express their opinions about the desirable change of the system. That produces heated and continuing arguments between the traditional experts and the proponents of the users' views. This study shows first the characteristics of the arguments between them, second whether the discipline of law and economics can make judgments on the economic outcomes of the proposals of the desired judicial system in terms of economic efficiency, third whether the comparative study of the US' and Japan's judicial systems contribute to the arguments about the judicial reform in Japan.
Depending on the Coase theorem, which spells the quick, certain, and inexpensive legal judgment and the enforcement of it decrease transaction costs, this study argues that the situation in Japan is on the opposite side of that. It also argues that the uncertainty of the law gives more room for judicial discretion to increase transaction costs, and that the government-supported restriction of competition among lawyers gives a lot of profit to the lawyers' guild.
