Abstract
In this paper, we attempt to examine the solution to the social order problem proposed by Talcott Parsons from the standpoint set down by Niklas Luhmann : and to clarify the contribution of Luhmann's “theory of self-referential systems” to theoretical development in this area of sociology.
According to Parsons' theory of action, the concept of “system” has two meanings : (a) a system made up of actions, (b) a system made up of analytical elements (a system of action). Parsons does not discuss in detail the problem of social order in (a). Rather, he quickly shifts his discussion to another emergent level of system (b), as he considers the problem of social order to be reducible to that of how the norm-conforming action is motivated and accomplished.
We consider it essential that a more direct inquiry be made into the constitutional relation between a system and actions (elements), which Luhmann terms “the problem of self-reference”. We describe, in terms of Luhmann's theory, “the mechanism of de-tautologization of self-reference”, by means of which every concrete system and action is organized : a restriction of relations between actions, that is, building a normative structure.
Structure-building does not, however, necessarily result in the acceptance of a restriction determined by a normative structure. Rather, it provides an actor with the alternatives of acceptance or rejection-in other words, with two possible responses to the structural restriction, with the structured complexity. Given a structure, one can act in response to other actions (other's actions) and recursively produce a succession of new actions. In conclusion, therefore, we define the social order as none other than the autopoietic reproduction of actions.
