Abstract
When do You darely “describe” other person's particuliar action in communication ? Although the statements as “You are bored.” “You must be enjoying this situation.” “You bit him.” …… seem to be cognitive behaviors that confirms the meaning of actions in question, at the same time, those statements can be seen as the ehtical commitments (speech acts) which refer to the rsponsibility of an actor for doing the action. Namely, it could be said that we “always-already” ascribe the particuliar action's responsibility in describing other's meaningful actions.
This paper intends to clarify the theoretical relation between the “description of an action” and “responsibility ascribing” from the theoretical-sociological viewpoint, which has dealt with the questions of the complicated connection lying in “the identification of an act” and meaningful “Verstehen” of an act.
At start, Schutz's theoretical argumentation which indicated the significance of telling “Umzu-Motiv” from “Weil-Motiv” at the occasion we theolize “Verstehen” of the action, will be forcused. After that, we will critically deal with Schutz's theory in the light of action theory in the contemporary analytical philosophy and sociological communication theory. Finally, refering to the theory of the morality which is elaborated by Luhmann, the sociological importance and relevance of “Moral” and “Responsibility-ascribing” in communiction will be clarified.
