Japanese Sociological Review
Online ISSN : 1884-2755
Print ISSN : 0021-5414
ISSN-L : 0021-5414
Sociology of “Nobility”
A Comparison of Bourdieu and Veblen with Signal Theory
Kazuma KOHARA
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2001 Volume 52 Issue 2 Pages 196-213

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Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the principle characteristics of the “nobility” theories of Bourdieu and Veblen through comparison with signal theory. Analysis shows that Veblen's theory shares the same premises and conclusions with Grafen' s signal (-handicap) theory. On the other hand, the basic concepts of Bourdieu' s theory, such as strategy or capital, only share the same premises with signal theory, but not conclusions. This means that there is incongruity in his basic concepts. We can find a solution for this problem by focusing on other premises hidden in his theory, which do not go along with his basic concepts. The first is the introduction of different basic needs, and the second is the introduction of economic determinism of action. The former means effectively the renunciation of the social-structural determinism of value and thus follows the Veblenian theory, whereas the latter means the abandonment of the strategy concept. In the process of analysis, it is also found that Bourdieu' s theory of “nobility” is economic-reductionist in a broad sense, and that Veblen's concept of “emulation” does not always imply a subject's direct intention. The latter counters Bourdieu and Elster's criticisms against Veblen.

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