2016 Volume 13 Pages 14-27
Theories on social welfare are differentiated along an ideological line. On one
side, there is the so-called neo-liberalism. According to this ideology, which is
based on the market fundamentalism, the governmental spending on social welfare
should be as minimal as possible. On the oppositional extreme side, there
is a set of theories that, while emphasizing the social importance of welfare values,
deny the necessity of considering the feasibility conditions. The theories of
this type may be characterized by the term “welfare absolutism.” The reason for
the negligence of feasibility conditions seems that to give any consideration on
restrictions imposed by resource limitation is, for those who stand on this side,
a serious deviation from “the ideal of welfare society.” This is a kind of welfare
fundamentalism. Of course actual arguments which would emphasize the ideal
of welfare society are not so simple. But among them there is a tendency that
any workfare-like policies are tend to be criticized as “coercion of self-support,”
or that the ideal called “post-productivism” is commended. Those theories
which would deliberately neglect the resource condition may be called “manna-
type welfare theory.” Both the neo-liberalism and the welfare absolutism are
ideological and not appropriate for a theory of social welfare. There are two axes
which differentiate these ideologies. The one is whether or not a theory attaches
the importance to the communal value of civil society, which resides in
the core of the ideal of welfare society. Another axis is whether or not a theory
takes a consideration on the resource conditions and the institutional arrangements.
Those theories which would attach the importance to the communal value
of civil society and, at the same time, take a serious consideration on the reabstract
source conditions may be called “commons-type welfare theory,” and this is the
one expected for theories of social welfare.
