知覚的で相互行為的な他者理解と理論説

抄録

In this paper, I defend the theory theory of understanding others against interaction theorists' challenge. According to the theory theory, our understanding of others relies on theoretical inference employing folk psychological knowledge. However, interaction theorists claim that our comprehension of others is a perceptual process embedded in practical interaction, which is not describable as a theoretical inferential process. I examine the arguments of theory theorists concerning the role of theoretical inference in perception and action. I also introduce the account of the perception of social affordance that can align with theory theory. Building upon these discussions, I propose an interpretation and the explanatory model of our experience of understanding others, wherein theoretical inference complements perceptual processes by providing a perceptual representation of other minds and affordance for interaction. Consequently, this paper concludes that the theory theory can interpret and explain our perceptual and interactive understanding of others.