国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
戦後日本外交とナショナリズム
ナショナリズムと自衛隊
―一九八七年・九一年の掃海艇派遣問題を中心に―
加藤 博章
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ジャーナル フリー

2012 年 2012 巻 170 号 p. 170_30-170_45

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The paper examines the change of perception among Japanese policy makers regarding the status and function of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) throughout the 1980s, and how this change was instrumental in the dispatch of the minesweeper flotilla to the Persian Gulf in 1991. After Japan regained independence in 1952, constitutional revision imposed severe limitations on the functions of the post-war military apparatus, the JSDF. Indeed, the Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ) and Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) regarded the JSDF as unconstitutional, and as a source for the revival of militarism.
The paper argues that in the mid-1980s, established perceptions reached a turning point and started evolving. It investigates one key factor that prompted such a perception shift, the problem of the dispatch of the Japan Maritime Self Defense force (JMSDF) minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. In 1987, the United States put pressure on the Japanese government to consider dispatching a naval force to Persian Gulf. This issue divided policy makers in three groups. The first group, including Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, agreed with the JMSDF dispatch to Persian Gulf. The second group disagreed with SDF dispatch, preferring the deployment of the Japan Coast Guard (JCC) instead. This group included Tadakazu Kuriyama, foreign ministry official, and senior staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The third group, including Masaharu Gotouda, chief cabinet secretary, SPJ, CPJ, supported no contribution. They thought that the dispatch overseas of JSDF and JCC were not permissible under the article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
The paper investigates the political debates that occurred within the three groups, focusing on how fears of strong criticism from the Japanese people and the psychological pressure of contributing to the alliance shaped the Japanese dilemma. The paper explores how these elements constituted core features of Japanese ‘post-war nationalism’. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the political debate reached the culminating point with the Japanese government decision to send JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. At the time, the SPJ, CPJ, and liberals from Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) raised a strenuous objection to send ships for the Gulf. Yet, the Japanese government decided in favour of the operation. In its aftermath, Japanese people did not support the views of SPJ and CPJ, nor they came to think that the JSDF were a symbol of revival of militarism. They recognized that the JSDF were a tool of international contributions.

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© 2012 財団法人 日本国際政治学会
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