一九五〇―七〇年代初頭フランスの旧仏領インドシナ外交の展開

―大統領の外交戦略と外務省の地域政策の交錯―

抄録

Despite French President Charles de Gaulle’s harsh criticism of the American war in Vietnam since 1963, Paris was chosen as the venue for the peace talks between the US and North Vietnam, which finally started in the spring of 1968. Indeed, the US had developed a profound distrust of de Gaulle’s diplomacy, especially with regard to the Vietnam War, and a series of disputes had arisen between the two countries. Why, then, did the US accept Paris as host of the delicate peace negotiations?
In order to answer that question, this article sheds light on the Quai d’Orsay’s role in French diplomacy toward all of Indochina (the two Vietnams, Cambodia and Laos). Before de Gaulle’s first intervention in this policy area in the summer of 1963, the Quai d’Orsay had played a dominant role in peace diplomacy in war-torn Indochina. Its main goal was to protect France’s interests and influence in the region, especially in South Vietnam. To achieve this goal, it was essential to maintain Franco-American cooperation, which had gradually been established in this region after France’s withdrawal in 1954. On the other hand, de Gaulle had very little interest in these “insignificant” local interests, and used Indochina as just as one of the platforms for his worldwide strategy for “grandeur française” and a more equal partnership with the US. That is, the Quai d’Orsay’s Indochinese policy objectives were radically different from those of the President, and were in fact often seriously hampered by de Gaulle’s initiatives. This article will examine how the Quai d’Orsay’s diplomacy intertwined with the President’s to form what we used to see as “France’s policy” toward Indochina.
Based on French archival materials, the article describes the development of the Quai d’Orsay’s regional policy, then the President’s initiatives, designed to serve his global strategy. The Quai d’Orsay took an apparently “neocolonialist” stance, seeking to preserve France’s historical and privileged relations with Indochina, as it did with Black Africa, while maintaining Franco-American cooperation. In contrast, in spite of American opposition,the French President proposed a scheme of “Neutralization” for the entire Indochinese Peninsula, including Vietnam, and ardently praised nationalist movements in the Third World, expressing his support for the independence of each nation in Indochina.
Given these fundamental differences, why were there no apparent contradictions and fluctuations in French Indochinese policy during this period? This article’s analysis shows, first, that, despite all their divergences, the French President and the Quai d’Orsay shared a commitment to the key concept of “Neutralization”; the vagueness of this term allowed them to make successive and substantive policy shifts without any visible disruptions. Second, the French President could count on the Director of Asia-Oceania, Etienne Manac’h, for policy coordination in this area. The experienced professional diplomat was a convinced socialist, but he turned out to be a most faithful executor of de Gaulle’s world strategy in the region, managing to impose de Gaulle’s policy on reluctant diplomats both in Paris and in the field,specifically in the Indochinese Peninsula.