Abstract
This paper sheds light on formerly unknown details about the diplomacy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to conclude the IAEA-Euratom agreement (hereafter the “verification agreement”), the signing of which in 1973 was an essential precondition for FRG’s ratification to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1974.
In order to start the negotiations to sign the verification agreement, FRG required consensus among the Euratom member states. However, France requested its exemption from the Euratom inspections as a condition of its agreement to start the negotiations. They argued that since the Euratom inspections should be under the influence of IAEA due to the verification agreement, France would be under the influence of IAEA as well because its peaceful nuclear activities were under the control of the Euratom inspections. However, there were no legally justifiable grounds for France to be under the influence of IAEA because it did not sign the NPT and therefore had no obligation at all toward IAEA. Therefore, in order for France to be freed from the influence of IAEA, it requested exemption from the Euratom inspections.
At first, FRG rejected this stance and tried to change France’s position; it was afraid that if France was exempted from the obligations of Euratom this could badly influence European integration. However, France would not change its position and FRG became concerned that worsening its relations with France would have an even more detrimental effect on European integration as a whole. In the end, FRG was judicious enough to concede to France’s request in order not to antagonize relations between them. As a result, France agreed to start negotiations to conclude the verification agreement.
Based on this consensus among the Euratom member states, FRG was able to start negotiations with IAEA. FRG aimed to minimize the influence of IAEA on Euratom and successfully achieved this objective. However, FRG was under strong pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States to conclude the negotiations and ratify the NPT as early as possible, since FRG’s ratification to it was one of the essential conditions for easing of the Cold War confrontations in Europe. Moreover, FRG itself was anxious to improve relations with the Eastern bloc as part of its “eastern policy.” FRG therefore pushed to ensure the date for signing of the verification agreement as soon as possible.
By these actions FRG achieved not only its fundamental purpose, minimizing the influence of IAEA over Euratom members, but also achieved its diplomatic objectives to maintain good relations with France and improve relations with members of the Eastern bloc.
