冷戦の変容と日米関係　一九七三―一九七五年

―米国による対日関係の再定義―

抄録

By 1973, Asia-Pacific regional order had experienced a dramatic transformation due to President Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing and Moscow in 1972, as well as to the settlement of Vietnam peace negotiations. From 1973 on, the United States began to pay more attention to its allies, including Japan, than it had in previous years.

This article examines how the U.S. government defined its partnership with Japan during the ebb of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region. It demonstrates that the United States became convinced of the direction of Japanese foreign policy, which was decidedly pro-American, and thus, came to evaluate Japan as a staunch partner in maintaining regional stability as well as in tackling problems caused by an emerging global interdependence. This, in turn, led to Washington’s redefinition of the U.S-Japanese alliance as a “pillar” of the America’s strategy.

In the early 1970s, U.S.-Japan relations deteriorated mainly because of the “Nixon Shocks” (Washington’s abrupt rapprochement with China and its new economic policies). By 1973, moreover, some American officials felt apprehension about an independent Japanese foreign policy. In November 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger requested the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to foresee the long-term foreign policy direction of Japan. A resulting memorandum noted that Japan would keep an alliance with Washington for ten years, thus easing apprehension among American officials toward Japan.

Kissinger, meanwhile, was confident in the détente with Moscow. Other officials also considered the Soviet diplomatic maneuver and its presence in the Asia-Pacific highly limited. Thus, the U.S. was required to define its alliance with Japan in the regional environment in which Washington faced no imminent threat. As regards to U.S.-China relations, it was getting stagnant, leading Kissinger to downplay the importance of it.

With the fall of Saigon, South Vietnam, in April 1975, Japanese foreign policies toward Asia and the United States were vigorously implemented, resulting in an improvement of the relations with South Korea, the beginning of cooperation with ASEAN, and the positive attitude toward military cooperation with Washington. Kissinger welcomed these active Japanese foreign policies. Kissinger, moreover, came to realize that Japan was playing an important role in addressing problems brought about by the global interdependence.

These changes in the configuration of the U.S. foreign policy mindset were clearly revealed in the “Pacific Doctrine” address delivered by President Gerald Ford in December 1975. In this address, Ford affirmed that America’s partnership with Japan was a “pillar” of the U.S. strategy, heralding a new era: one in which the U.S.-Japanese alliance would play a robust stabilizing role in the region and in the interdependent world.