朝鮮における「封じ込め」の模索-戦争以前の米国の政策-

冷戦期アメリカ外交の再検討

抄録

American policy toward Korea had its own character during the time from the summer of 1947 to the outbreak of the Korean War. It differed from the policy up to that time, because the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet Union had disappeared. Also, it differed from the policy after that time because the American direct military commitment to South Korea had not yet been established. The American policy during this transitional period may be defined as containment by limited means.
The U. S. did not recognize the strategic value of Korean peninsula in the context of the war against the Soviet Union. The U. S. tried to maintain a non-communist government in South Korea for political reasons. First of all, the U. S. could not endure the loss of its prestige, which had been staked on Korea since the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and its two years Occupational Administration in South Korea. Secondly, the U. S. had to prevent political repercussions throughout the Far East. Unless the U. S., upon withdrawal of its troops from South Korea, left sufficient indigenous military strength to enable South Korea to defend itself against any but an overt act of aggression, U. S. withdrawal could be interpreted as a betrayal of its friends and allies in the Far East. Thirdly, the overthrow by Soviet-dominated forces of a regime established in South Korea under the aegis of the UN would constitute a severe blow to the prestige and influence of the UN.
From the end of 1949 to the spring of 1950, this policy was authorized in the larger context of its Far Eastern strategy, which was formulated under the influences of the Chinese Revolution. Although the level of American commitment to South Korea was increasing, there was no change in the policy to contain the communist threat without direct military commitment.