国際経済をめぐる政治についての理論と実証-米国の対外貿易政策を背景にして-

国際政治の理論と実証

抄録

The “hegemonic model” presupposes the existence of an economic “hegemon” for an open international trade system. According to the model, the United States in the postwar period, like Great Britain in 19th century Europe, played the role of a hegemon in the creation and maintenance of a free trade regime. However, the decline of American economic power since the late 1960s implied that the United States would increasingly depart from its free-trade position, letting the specter of protectionism haunt the world. The model is criticized for neglecting foreign-policy considerations for free trade.
The “bipolar system model” relates the postwar U. S. trade policy to the structure of East-West relations. The United States pursued a free trade policy in order to guarantee the cohesion of the Western coalition against the communist bloc. The United States benevolently opened its market to imports from the allied countries, while allowing these countries to be largely negligent in opening their own markets to U. S. products. As the cold-war system declined, however, the U. S. incentive for such a trade policy declined. The United States become less and less patient with its allies over bilateral economic conflicts and more susceptible to domestic protectionist pressures. Our close examination of the U. S. -Japan textile disputes during three different time periods (1947-60, 1961-68, and 1969-71) demonstrates that, as the cold-war tension subsided, these issues became progressively more complex and increasingly politicized, requiring more time for resolution, involving higher-level officials, and spilling over into other issue areas.
Neither the “hegemonic model” nor the “bipolar system model” sufficiently explains the U. S. trade policy since the mid-1970s. Despite the further decline of U. S. economic power and despite the demise of the traditional cold-war system, the U. S. executive branch —as opposed to domestic interest groups and Congress— has been upholding the principle of free trade. One can argue that, the relative decline of its economic position notwithstanding, the United States is still economically the most powerfule country in the world, and that, in spite of so-called “multipolarization, ” the basic East-West conflict remains unresolved and the U. S.-Soviet tension has even been rising again over the last few years. However, there seem to be more relevant explanations.
First of all, it may be pointed out that trade liberalism has developed into a bipartisan ideology among U. S. officials over the last three decades. There is a growing realization among executive-branch officials that the free trade regime established by the United States after World Wae II may actually disintegrate if things are left to take their own course, and this very realization seems to have the effect of increasing the legitimacy of the free-trade ideology. Moreover, America's growing dependence on foreign trade in recent years has made U. S. officials resist accepting trade-restrictionist solutions to avoid exacerbating the problem of inflation and recession at home, as seen in the 1977 steel trade issue with Japan. The trade-expansionist approach being emphasized by the American goverment is reflected in the U. S. demand that Japan and other allies open up their own markets U. S. products.
Whether or not the United States abandons its role —either as a bloc leader or primus inter pares (if not as a hegemon)— will depend on the ability of Japan and other major Western industrialized countries to help U. S. officials fight domestic protectionism. But these other countries also face increasingly self-assertive domestic groups. Consequently, a realistic model of trade policy will need to take into consideration the dynamics of domestic and alliance politics as well.