講和直後の国際環境と日本のガット仮加入

昭和初期における外交と経済

抄録

Owing to its change of government, the United States was not prepared to participate in tariff negotiations in 1953. Because U. S. participation was a precondition for a GATT tariff conference to be held, Japan could not enter GATT through the normal accession procedures. In addition, several countries such as Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, made objections to Japan's making use of “simplified accession procedures”. Under these circumstances, Japan chose to enter GATT through the “provisional accession” formula. The formula consisted of two parts: (1) Decision regarding the participation of Japan in the Sessions of the Contracting Parties; and (2) Declaration regulating the Commercial Relations between Certain Contracting Parties and Japan. Complicated diplomatic processes were involved in the eventual adoption of this two part formula.
This article describes Japanese provisional accession in 1953, with a main focus on the roles of Toru Hagiwara, the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, and Wyndham-White, the Executive Secretary of GATT; the diplomatic offensive by the United States and Japan towards Britain and Britain's change of policy; and the diplomatic process between the Commonwealth countries and its final outcome.
The success of Japanese provisional accession owed much to the active role played by Wyndham-White, who was not merely a messenger or coordinator behind the scenes, but rather the main player who first postulated the idea of provisional accession. Secondly, the strategy of separating provisional accession into two parts proved fruitful. Though Britain was obliged to abstain from voting due to Commonwealth connections, even Britain did not want the first part of the provisional accession to fail as a result of such an action.