テロリズム対策における戦略文化 -一九九〇年代後半の日米を事例として-

国際政治と文化研究

抄録

In the late 1990s, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism had reached the top of the agenda in counter-terrorism communities. Since a Japanese terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo sprinkled nerve gas in Tokyo subways in March 1995, Japan and the United States, with other G8 members, have agreed with many antiterrorism measures including exchange of information about WMD terrorism, and at least superficially must have shared common threat perception of WMD terrorism.
The question here is why the United States has enthusiastically prepared for WMD terrorism in its homeland in spite of no record of genuine WMD terrorism, in contrast to Japan who tackled Aum Shinrikyo but has been ill prepared for terrorism in general. Since rational actor models may not explain the sharp contrast, this paper examines it from the strategic cultures' point of view.
The term strategic cultures can be defined as collective beliefs, lessons of the past, attitudes and values shared in one country or in a national strategic community that influence the way of thinking, problem-solving and use of force in national security issues.
The concept of terrorism has been socially constructed in communities; accordingly, it is until now not easy to share definitions of terrorism in the United Nations, even in one country like the United States whose agencies have its own definition. That is to say, we must pay attention to cultural dimensions in order to grasp the perception of terrorism and the antiterrorism policy in any one country.
Strategic cultures of the United States are deeply reflected in the preparedness of CBRN terrorism. The first is the worldview to interpret terrorism as a kind of totalitarianism. The second is clarity of enemy in the national security policy, which is manifest in the designation of countries supporting terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). The third is U. S.' traditional sensitivity to homeland defense, which takes over the Domestic Preparedness Program in the Clinton Administration.
Japan also has national ideas of terrorism. First, antiterrorism is a taboo in peacetime because of human rights norm. No antiterrrorism acts have been passed. Second, a risk-averse policy is viewed as the best choice, which is made explicit in behavior during hostage-taking incidents, and in vague attitudes toward terrorist organizations, unlike the United States. Third, the preference is a so-called root-cause theory; unless poverty, suppression and/or inequality are eradicated, terrorism will not disappear on earth. These ideas prevent Japan from promoting counter-terrorism policies.
The examples of U. S. and Japan indicate that cultural ideas can be represented in the way of thinking about terrorism and counter-terrorism policy. It is debatable, however, how and to what degree particular culture causes each measure and decision-making. It needs further investigation.