抄録
Colombian stable democratic regime has its origin in the coalition of political elites between Liberals and Conservatives, which formed the political regime of the bipartisan government called the National Front (1958-1974). This bipartisan regime (“bipartidismo” in Spanish) has been backed by the patron-client relationship of intermediation.
The process of political reform to change “bipartidismo” took the first step in the 1980s, as the decentralization policy institutionalized in 1983, and then made another considerable progress by means of the new Constitution of 1991. Some new rules introduced in this Constitution express explicitly anti-clientelistic practice, such as the abolition of “parliamentary subsidy”. Another institutional reform worth being emphasized is the creation of JAL (Local Administrative Board), which stimulated the political participation of leftist and civic movement organizations. In fact, the result of elections of central as well as local government since the 1990s shows that the dominance of two traditional parties has been slightly declined while the penetration of non-bipartisan power has been increased.
This article argues how the recent trends of decreasing “bipartidismo” have influenced the patron-clientelistic relation at the level of local community in Colombia. Have the patron-clientelistic practices been reduced, or maintained? Are there any indications on the emergence of autonomous civil society?
First, the historical process of Colombian patron-client system in the context of bipartisan regime is surveyed. Creation of JAC (Community Action Board) and its national expansion is interpreted as the outcome of the political intention to diffuse the National Front regime.
Second, a series of political reforms since the 1980s and its general reflection in the result of elections are analyzed, pointing out that the share of non-bipartisan power is increasing as a common phenomenon among different levels of governments.
Finally, the inhabitants' opinion and behavior toward political intervention are analyzed, based on the author's case studies of two contrasting irregular settlements in Bogotá. One is a settlement showing the strong influence of political clientelism, built by a politician's direct intervention. The other has been abandoned by the intervention of the city authorities, under its evaluation as a “red zone”. Their up-grading processes are compared, especially in terms of the inhabitants' behavior toward the political intervention and of their strategies resorted to obtain basic services. The findings from this exercise show that the new type of patron-clientelism has been reproduced between JAL representatives and JAC leaders, while some of the autonomous community actions for political participation indicate the emergence of civil society. All this leads to the conclusion that the Colombian political process is evolving toward a transitional stage.
