国内紛争後の政治改革への国際関与

国際秩序と国内秩序の共振

抄録

What kind of political system should the international community prepare in territories internationally administered like Kosovo in order to avoid ethnic conflicts after transfer of political authority? In arguments on peace building in post-conflict societies, because of a focus on social economic problems, problems of political systems and political reforms have not always been examined theoretically until now. In arguments over international territorial administration, the importance of governance and democracy is pointed out; however, political systems and political reforms have not been discussed adequately.
The purpose of this paper is to examine a problem: how should we divide political authority between the majority and the minority to create incentives for the majority to promote cooperative political reforms in post-conflict societies? We suppose that there are two types of political reform; nationalistic and cooperative political reforms. The former is a political reform in which the majority develops nationalistic activity, and the latter is a political reform guaranteeing collective rights of the minority. Furthermore, we suppose that there are two types of political power; political decision-making power and political bargaining power. Political decision-making power is authority regarding how to accept nationalistic activity of the majority, and political bargaining power is authority to distribute payoffs of a political reform between the majority and the minority. Our problem is; how should we distribute two political powers between the majority and the minority for the majority to restrain nationalistic political reform and to promote cooperative political reform?
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, in the case that political reform is not carried out, an actor having political bargaining power can increase its payoff, whoever may have decision-making power. Therefore, it is important who has political bargaining power. Second, in the case. that they cannot negotiate regarding the amount of nationalistic activity, if the majority has the political decision-making power, it has incentive to carry out nationalistic political reform. If the minority holds political decision-making power, the majority has incentive for cooperative political reform. Therefore, distribution of political decision-making power is important. Third, in the case that they can negotiate regarding the amount of nationalistic activity, we should give the minority both political decision-making power and political bargaining power to restrain the majority from making nationalistic political reforms. On the other hand, we should give the minority political decision-making power and the majority political bargaining power for the majority to promote cooperative political reforms.