Conflicted Conservatives: Trust in Market Institutions and Support for Government Spending

Abstract

Public opinion research has found that voters’ ideological positions are poorly correlated with their preferences for social welfare and limited government in Japan. That is, previous studies suggest that the conservatives and the reformists support increased government spending to an equal degree. In contrast, this article shows that ideology is still an important determinant of welfare spending preferences. Specifically, ideology plays a role as a moderator, which conditions the relationship between trust in market institutions and welfare spending preferences. This article argues that ideology provides the context in which trust in market institutions affects welfare spending preferences, although it does not directly affect welfare spending preferences.

Analysis using data from the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) shows the following findings. Regarding welfare spending, there is no gap in opinions between conservatives and reformists in Japan. What is important is not the conflict between the conservatives and the reformists, but the conflict between the conservatives who trust market institutions and the conservatives who do not trust market institutions. Other things being equal, the predicted probabilities of support for social security and employment measures are the lowest for the conservatives who trust market institutions, and are the highest for the conservatives who do not trust market institutions. Given that social security and employment measures are the major activities of the welfare state, ardent supporters of the welfare state are not necessarily the reformists. The results of this article suggest that the conflicted conservatives are not only potential opponents but also potential supporters of the welfare state.