Cosmetic surgery is generally believed to be performed to address an “inferiority complex” or an attempt to “appeal to others”. However, people who undergo cosmetic surgery emphasize “self-satisfaction”, and are also concerned about how their appearance is evaluated by others. Previous studies regarding “the others” as “the opposite-sex” or “the social” (generalized other), and have overlooked who specifically “the others” are in these cases. Therefore, this paper tries to clarify the persons who cosmetic surgery seekers and practitioners make reference to.
Previous studies often only target persons who experienced cosmetic surgery, but in this paper I compare with seekers and non- seekers, or experienced persons and non-experienced persons, while interviewing experienced persons. This is because the comparative analysis clarifies something combined with cosmetic surgery experience. While previous studies have focused on their motivations, I have focused on their communications.
From the analysis, I find that they (seekers, experienced persons) refer to same-sex friends firstly, and then their mother or sister. Considering that there are more women who commit to cosmetic surgery than men, a “network of women” involved in the appearance is important. For women, in communication with familiar same-sex people, not the opposite sex and society (generalized others) “horizon”—the social world we change our appearance in—is established.
This paper explores long-term changes in political alienation using cohort analysis. Empirical research shows that political alienation, which is defined as a lack of political efficacy, is a factor leading to the decline in political participation. However, long-term changes in political alienation and its determinants in Japan have been little studied. In this paper, using data from the “Survey on Japanese Orientations from 1973 to 2008” conducted by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), we examined the realities of long-term changes in political alienation, the size of the generational effect and period effect as specified factors, and political alienation in the younger generation.
The results of the linear decomposition and multiple regression analysis indicated the following three points: (1) Political alienation increased from 1973 to 1998 and was reduced from 1998 to 2008. The trend of this change was shared between generations. (2) The increase in political alienation from 1973 to 1998 resulted from a positive period effect and a positive generation effect; the decrease in political alienation from 1998 to 2008 resulted from a negative period effect that exceeded a positive generation effect. (3) The young generation is more likely than the baby-boomer generation to be politically marginalized. Therefore, we interpret the generation effect as a war and democratization experience and the period effect as an increase in the possibility of change in government due to the collapse of the 55 system.
Since the 1990s, conservatives have created many groups in Japan. The reasons people participate in these movements have been discussed with the keywords “anxiety” and “healing.” According to recent studies, social changes such as the end of the Cold War system, globalization, and an increase in non-regular employment make people concerned and join conservative movements to reassure themselves by accepting one another and attacking socially vulnerable people. However, there is a question whether this theory can be applied to female conservative activists, because in many countries, researchers have shown that female conservatives have been discriminated against in the movements.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the interaction among members of conservative movements in Japan from a gender perspective. The data was gathered through participant observation conducted in a female conservative group in 2014.
Results of the analysis show that members of the group make jokes frequently and there are two types of jokes that have different functions. One is right-wing jokes related to anti-Korean sentiment and Japanese nationalism. These kinds of jokes were based on the knowledge and values shared by members, and functioned to facilitate communication. Another type of jokes was sexist ones related to sexual slavery by the Japanese military during WWII. This type of jokes was enjoyed by elder male members, and they consider women who were Japanese military sex slaves as sexual objects. In contrast, many female members could not show an active reaction such as laughter or anger to elder male members; they only gave a grim smile.
My research reveals difficulties surrounding female conservatives and gender discrimination in conservative movements. The sexist jokes have different functions for male and female participants.
Public opinion research has found that voters’ ideological positions are poorly correlated with their preferences for social welfare and limited government in Japan. That is, previous studies suggest that the conservatives and the reformists support increased government spending to an equal degree. In contrast, this article shows that ideology is still an important determinant of welfare spending preferences. Specifically, ideology plays a role as a moderator, which conditions the relationship between trust in market institutions and welfare spending preferences. This article argues that ideology provides the context in which trust in market institutions affects welfare spending preferences, although it does not directly affect welfare spending preferences.
Analysis using data from the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) shows the following findings. Regarding welfare spending, there is no gap in opinions between conservatives and reformists in Japan. What is important is not the conflict between the conservatives and the reformists, but the conflict between the conservatives who trust market institutions and the conservatives who do not trust market institutions. Other things being equal, the predicted probabilities of support for social security and employment measures are the lowest for the conservatives who trust market institutions, and are the highest for the conservatives who do not trust market institutions. Given that social security and employment measures are the major activities of the welfare state, ardent supporters of the welfare state are not necessarily the reformists. The results of this article suggest that the conflicted conservatives are not only potential opponents but also potential supporters of the welfare state.
This paper aims to consider the modernization of urban festivals in Japan by analyzing the regulation of “violence” in the case of the Kishiwada Danjiri Festival.
A traditional festival held in Osaka, the Kishiwada Danjiri Festival is characterized as one of the most dangerous festivals in Japan. Sudden fights and accidents are highly common, and even expected from the audience despite enforcement by the police. The highlight of this festival is called yarimawashi, which refers to the float turning a corner without slowing down. In recent years, Yarimawashi is getting faster and more dangerous. Why is this happening?
The Kishiwada Danjiri Festival has undergone changes throughout its history. The festival has been “sportized” (Elias & Dunning 1986) between the internal and external aspects of the festival. Internally, the boundaries of membership have been changed to exclude violence and control the festival. Externally, negotiations with the police help keep the festival in line with the values and norms of modern society. The interdependence between these two surfaced as the focal point of competition in the festival, which later became radicalized and extreme. In the present day, performing yarimawashi has become a competitive event that is seen and scored by a large audience.
This paper will analyze how the “sportization” of the festival has enabled participants to pursue an extreme form of yarimawashi within the rules. However, participants are potentially “individualized” and graded on a scale of merit; they have become increasingly likely to be treated as fungible assets.
There are two separate mechanisms in the creation of inequality of educational opportunity (IEO): the association between students’ class backgrounds and their academic performance at school—primary effects—and the differences in the educational choices made by students of different social classes, conditional on their previous performance—secondary effects. This article starts by analyzing PISA 2003 data to address the relative influence of primary and secondary effects in class differentials in one crucial decision within Japanese educational system: that in which, after graduating from high school, students do, or do not, intend to proceed to higher education. And then, we investigate whether international variation of IEO overall and relative importance of these two kinds of effect can be accounted for by differences in the setup of national educational systems.
The estimation of primary and secondary effects is based on counterfactual analysis. This approach allows us to compare actual with counterfactual log-odds ratio and compute quantitative estimates of the relative importance of primary and secondary effects. The means and standard deviations of performance scores of one class are combined with the parameters of logistic curves of another class to produce a counterfactual, or synthesized, outcome. A hypothetical situation is deliberated where the performance distribution changes while choice characteristics remain the same and vice versa. Results show, for our cases, in Japan that secondary effects have accounted for a greater part of the inequality in educational expectation. Highly stratified systems with tracked educational pathways appear to lead to increasing primary effects. The association between the stratification of educational systems and the strengths of secondary effects is vague. As a whole, enhancing the degree of stratification shifts relative influence of IEO mechanisms from direct effects to indirect effects through differences in previous performance across social classes.
To date, sociological action theory has been paid little attention to violent action, especially in the context of men’s domestic violence and sexual violence against women. Previous research, especially radical feminism, explains how patriarchy shapes violence. Criminological research, based on Talcott Parsons’s theory, posits that men’s social role influences men’s violence. Messerschmidt’s criticism such explanations is that they pay little attention to the social dynamics related to violence. He demonstrates men’s violence has a social aspect that can be conceptualized as “doing masculinity”. In this chapter, the author intends to analyze the effectiveness of Messerschimdt’s theory and discussions. There are many facets Messerschmidt’s considers when investigating social process of violence. He intends to conceptualize and understand violent action as an interrelation of gender, sexuality, ethnicity and social class. In some social situations, some men may experience the marginalization of his social self and in specific situations, the subordination of his masculinity. In terms of “doing masculinity”, violent acts can be understood as actions expressing a dominant form of masculinity. In this context, a violent actor intends to diminish subordinated masculinity and be an appropriate masculine actor. Furthermore, in this chapter the author discusses how, and which, social identities tied to masculinity contribute to the social process of sexual violence. Messerschmidt conceptualizes “doing heteromasculinity” to interpret and explain motivations of sexual violence. Although notions of hetero-normativity in North America are different from Japanese ones, fundamentally modern society is characterized by heterosexuality. The author supposes quite large numbers of men emphasize the aspect of “hetero masculine self”. To sum up, much more research about men’s domestic violence and sexual violence should be conducted in considering the context and influences of social conceptions of masculinity.
This paper explores the politics of “memories on war” in popular culture through analyzing the process of constructing Chiran as a Tokkō memorial site. Recently, more and more tourists visit Chiran, where the Japanese army’s Tokkō air base was built and many Tokkō airplanes took off at the end of war. Visitors are moved by the “pure sentiments” of the Tokkō pilots, seeing the mementos of those dead pilots in some museums and visiting other memorial sites of Tokkō in Chiran town.
However, Chiran was not famous for “Tokkō” in the early postwar years. Moreover, “Tokkō” was not the experience of the people in Chiran. The men who took off from Chiran and performed Tokkō attacks were not Chiran residents, but army pilots who had come from various air bases. Nevertheless, why and how did Chiran become to be well-known as the “Town of Tokkō”?
This paper surveys the process of the construction of Chiran as the “Town of Tokkō” in a view of historical sociology, and then, analyzes the politics of the “memories on war” in popular culture in postwar Japan.
This paper reviews research on the relationship between the armed forces and society, and focus on the specific and everyday civil-military relations in sociological and anthropological studies. The goal is to show the relations with the armed forces and individuals, which were deeply embedded in social practices on Japanese society. According to prior research by Frühstück & Ben-Ari (2002) and others, it has been over twenty years since the Japan Self-Defense Forces have softened their public relations policies. I focus on the marriage hunting for the JSDF personnel. This research draws upon mostly primary sources including monthly magazines and interviews with editors, JSDF officials, marriage introduction agencies, etc. I focus on how the self-images of JDSF personnel are represented, along with the images of ideal girlfriends and desirable wives.
In general military wives are expected to assume a dual role based on their husbands’ military affiliations; one is a brave and independent-minded attitude when their husbands are deployed, and the other is an obedient and patient stance toward their husbands (Segal 1986). I noticed the absence of discussions on the roles of military wives in Japan. A monthly magazine that runs a serialized column on marriage hunting for JSDF personnel has gained popularity. Besides the magazine, there are many matchmaking parties for them. I compare the underlying motives of the JDSF personnel, the matchmaking agencies, and the matchmaking applicants. There was a gap between the civilians and JDSF personnel. I believe this is a distinctive feature of Japanese military institutions.